# 1NC – R1 v Baylor BL – Happy Shirley!!

### 1NC

#### Interpretation: The resolution should define the division of ground- the role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.

#### The ‘United States federal government’ is the three branches.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### The resolution is a proposition of policy – “United States” and “should” prove

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Core antitrust laws refer to statutory laws – the increased prohibitions must be reflected IN Clayton, Sherman and FTC

Kuntz 2-23-21

(Kendall. MARYLAND CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW. Can the Courts and New Antitrust Laws Break Up Big Tech? https://www.law.umaryland.edu/Programs-and-Impact/Business-Law/JBTLOnline/Break-Up-Big-Tech/)

There are three core antitrust laws in effect today: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These three antitrust laws attempt to protect market competition for the benefit of consumers. The Sherman Act outlaws monopolies and contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. The Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. Lastly, the Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Antitrust laws are not established to punish success, but are focused on preventing anticompetitive effects, exclusionary practices, reduced consumer choice, and hindered innovation.

#### C. Two impacts:

#### 1. Clash: Debate requires negation- affirmatives that don’t address the resolution makes irrative clash impossible because shifting away from the resolutional agent and mechanism kills negative ground by making it concessionary and allows for aff conditionality which cements the structural advantages of the affirmative through crushing limits.

#### 2. Fairness- debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary generics – they allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage, because all the aff has to do is find evidence supporting an ideological orientation towards the world – this crushes clash because all of our prepared negative strategies are based on praxis, and by not defending a clear actor and mechanism we lose 90% of negative ground, and the aff still retains traditional competition standards like perms to make being neg impossible

### 1NC

#### Pessimistic politics saps the utopian energy of modernity, fueling neoliberal abandonment of progressive democratic politics. This affective demobilization results in passivity and resignation.

Karlsson 14 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “Theorizing sustainability in a post-Concorde world,” *Technology in Society* 39.1, http://bit.ly/2j6e614]

Certain in their belief that “ecological losses cannot be undone through the basic tenets of modernity” ([36]:245) as in the continuation of the rationalist-scientific enterprise, political ecologists seek to halt, and ultimately reverse, the structural processes of modernity. Running directly counter to prevailing socio-economic dynamics, it is not surprising that this effort has met with limited success. But by constantly emphasizing the ecological destructive tendencies of modernity while ignoring its long-term potential, political ecologists have been surprisingly successful in eroding our confidence in that science and technology can be used, in a conscious and radical manner, to ultimately overcome these destructive tendencies. By doubting our ability to consciously govern the future, political ecologists have drained the modern project of its utopian energies, effectively creating a passivity towards the future by which short-sighted market imperatives, rather than transparent democratic decisions and long-term public investments, become the determining factors. Instead of shiny fusion reactors and space travel, we are beginning to realize that the future may well be one of oil sands, offshore drilling, and increasingly destructive resource wars. Ironically, it may thus be that it is these feelings of passivity and doubt that ultimately will help create the very future that political ecologists fear. While few would dispute the more general claim that there has been a loss of confidence in our ability to democratically decide the long-term future ([75]; p. 6; [82]; p. 1), it would certainly be incorrect to attribute all of this loss to a relative small number of political ecologists, working on the margins of social discourse. But in their role as “truth tellers”, political ecologists have been able to tap into more general sentiments of estrangement that modernity has created. Capitalizing on the ontological insecurity arising from the acceleration of change in contemporary society, political ecologists have been able to project an alternative world of permanence and belonging. While such a world would also mean a foregoing of the existential freedom and mobility that modernity has given rise to [33], it is important to remember that for most people this is not about articulating a coherent social philosophy but about giving voice to a feeling of psychological bewilderment. In a similar fashion, while most people would, on reflection, acknowledge that humanity's lot has vastly improved over the last two hundred years, there are also legitimate concerns about the growth of conspicuous consumption, the emptiness of materialism, and the deep inequalities that persist, in particular at the global level. By articulating such concerns, political ecologists speak where others remain silent, an act which in itself has generated sufficient epistemic noise and doubt, not to reverse modernity, but to put sand in its machinery. Meanwhile, economic globalization has continued unchecked, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty (most notably in China) but also fuelling resentment as labour markets have become ever more stratified. Instead of seeing the possibilities in new global forms of welfare capitalism, the Left has found itself helplessly watching as an ever tighter straitjacket has been sewn around its political ambitions. For the Right, the same straitjacket has been viewed as a “golden straitjacket” ([31]:104) thought to ensure prudent macroeconomic policies, monetary stability, and protect against economic interventionism. Although recent events may have shattered some of those beliefs, these “ideas still walk among us” [70] to a surprisingly high degree, largely because the Left has been unable to formulate a coherent ideological alternative. Arguably, the most important legacy of the last decades of neoliberalism has been its attack on the idea of a self-directing democratic future. Neoliberals have been particularly opposed to the idea that society should make “grand” choices or pursue different “utopian” visions of the future. Instead, neoliberals believe that the state should at a maximum provide the “framework for utopia” [64] within which individuals can then pursue their own conceptions of the good. In relation to modernity, neoliberals have sought to convey the impression that all its grand tasks have either been completed or proven impossible; that redistribution has been attempted but failed since the poor are not poor because of structural reasons but because of lacking individual ambition, and that the road to the future goes through privatization and away from the public as an acting political subject. Contrary to the historic evidence of how public scientific research has driven long run growth in modern capitalism [55], neoliberals have argued that most public investments are “inherently wasteful” ([12]:153) and have forcefully hammered home the message that financial markets alone are able to make wise allocation choices and that markets can accurately reflect all relevant sources of social risk. Again, it is easy to think that these beliefs should have been thoroughly falsified by the recent financial meltdown which, if anything, has proven that markets are particularly bad at correctly estimating systemic risks. Yet, even in these extreme times, the Left has shown a remarkable lack of political imagination and remained trapped in nostalgic dreams of its own past glories. Unable to invigorate the utopian energies of modernity yet equally unwilling to commit to their reversal, contemporary society finds itself in a state of debilitating disorientation [44]. In the West, in particularly in the United States and Great Britain, rifts in the fabric of modernity are beginning to show. Bridges in perpetual disrepair, decrepit concrete motorway interchanges, and chronically delayed trains are all products of a politics of decline. While some of these effects may be caused simply by an early entry into industrialism, they also reflect a deeper political paralysis, one that has been made worse by ever harsher demands for public austerity. Despite record levels of private wealth, we increasingly find that we can no longer afford to invest in the future. While the reactionary worldview has found itself in ascendance, the Left, tied down by postmodern quibbles, has become fundamentally uncertain about what purposes its politics should serve. In the imagery of this article, we can now more clearly see what forces that are defining the post-Concorde world. On one hand, we have the political ecological critique of modernity which has revealed the terrible ecological price that human development has exerted yet obscured its emancipatory hopes and long-term potential. On the other hand, as the neoliberal rhetoric about the inherent wastefulness of public investments has taken hold, we find the very idea of the future as a site of democratic choice to be under attack by far more powerful forces. Taken together, these otherwise unrelated ideological currents have to a large extent succeeded in destabilizing the modern project and replacing it with a sense of resignation and pessimism about the future. Although we remain haunted by fears of far-future catastrophes (it is for instance commonly acknowledged that the most devastating effects of climate change will not be felt until the end of this century), such long time horizons are not at all employed when discussing what possibilities humanity may have as we are emerging as a planetary civilization. This mismatch between problems and solutions reflects a profound uncertainty about the desired direction of change, an uncertainty which, this article suggests, may in fact be our most serious cause for concern. If it is correct to say that the post-Concorde world is characterized by a deep-felt ambivalence towards modernity, then it becomes important to spell out the implications of this ambivalence in terms of our prospects for environmental sustainability.

#### Climate change causes extinction – feedback loops make adaptation impossible.

Beard et al. 21 (S.J. Beard; Senior Research Associate and Academic Programme Manager at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, S.J. Beard, Lauren Holt, Asaf Tzachor, Luke Kemp, Shahar Avin, Haydn Belfield; Centre for the Study of Existential Risk research associates, Phil Torres of Torres 16; visiting scholar at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at Leibniz Universität Hannover, Assessing climate change’s contribution to global catastrophic risk, Futures Volume 127, March 2021, 102673, [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328720301646#](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328720301646)!, MAM)

While most of the impacts of climate change so far have fallen within the range of what was experienced during the Holocene, the rate of change is **faster than** in **the Holocene** and we are now beginning to see climate change push **beyond these boundaries**. In the latest edition of the planetary boundaries’ framework, climate change is placed in the zone of increasing risk, implying that while this boundary has been breached, there remains some **potential** for normal functioning and recovery (Steffen et al., 2015). It thus lies between what the authors identify as the ‘safe zone’ and other ‘high risk’ transgressions, such as disruption to the biochemical flows of nitrogen and phosphorus and loss of biosphere integrity. As part of their discussion of BRIHN Baum and Handoh (2014) note that climate change is the planetary boundary for which the risk to humanity has received most meaningful consideration and they suggest that this attention is deserved. Yet little research attention has been paid to climate change’s extreme or catastrophic effects. Kareiva and Carranza (2018) argue that, despite currently falling outside of the area of high risk, climate change has the clear potential to push humanity across a threshold of irreversible loss by “changing major ocean circulation patterns, causing massive sea-level rise, and increasing the frequency and severity of extreme events… that displace people, and ruin economies.” Even if humanity was resilient to each of these individual impacts, a global catastrophe could occur if these impacts were to occur **rapidly and simultaneously**. One scenario that has received comparatively more attention is that of the global climate crossing a tipping point that would trigger environmental feedback loops (such as declining albedo from melting ice or the release of methane from clathrates) and cascading effects (such as shifting rainfall patterns that trigger desertification and soil erosion). After this point, anthropogenic activity may cease to be the main driver of climate change, making it accelerate and become harder to stop (King et al., 2015). Other scenarios can be discerned from the numerous historical cases in which the modest, usually regional, climatic changes experienced during the Holocene have been implicated in the collapse of previous societies, including the Anasazi, the Tiwanaku, the Akkadians, the Western Roman Empire, the lowland Maya, and dozens of others (Diamond, 2005, Fagan, 2008). These provide a precedent for how a changing climate can trigger or contribute to societal breakdown. At present, our understanding of this phenomena is limited, and the IPCC has labelled its findings as “low confidence” due to a lack of understanding of cause and effect and restrictions in historical data (Klein et al., 2014). Further study and cooperation between archaeologists, historians, climate scientists and global catastrophic risk scholars could overcome some of these limitations by identifying how the impacts of climate change translate into social transformation and collapse, and hence what the impacts of more rapid and extreme climatic changes might be. There is also the potential for larger studies into how global climate variations have coincided with collapse and violence at the regional level (Zhang, Chiyung, Chusheng, Yuanqing, & Fung, 2005; Zhang et al., 2006). However, these need to be interpreted and generalized with care given the differences between pre-industrial and modern societies. Societies also have a long history of adapting to, and recovering from, climate change induced collapses (McAnany and Yoffee, 2009). However, there are two reasons to be sceptical that such resilience can be easily extrapolated into the future. First, the relatively stable context of the Holocene, with well-functioning, resilient ecosystems, has greatly assisted recovery, while **anthropogenic climate change** is more rapid, pervasive, global, and severe. Large-scale states did not emerge until the onset of the Holocene (Richerson, Boyd, & Bettinger, 2001), and societies have since remained in a surprisingly narrow climatic niche of roughly 15 mean annual average temperature (Xu, Kohler, Lenton, Svenning, & Scheffer, 2020). A return to agrarian or hunter-gatherer lifestyles could thus have more devastating and long-lasting effects in a world of rapid climate change and ecological disruption (Gowdy, 2020).7 Second, modern human societies may have developed **hidden fragilities that amplify the shocks** posed by climate change (Mannheim 2020) and the complex, tightly-coupled and interdependent nature of our socio-economic systems makes it more likely that the failure of a few key states or industries due to climate change could cascade into a global collapse (Kemp, 2019). A third set of plausible scenarios stem from climate change’s broader environmental impacts. Apart from being a planetary boundary of its own, Steffen et al. (2015) point out that climate change is intimately connected with other planetary boundaries (see Table 1). Climate change is thus identified by the authors as one of two ‘core’ boundaries with the potential “to drive the Earth system into a new state should they be substantially and persistently transgressed.” This transformative potential was elaborated on in subsequent work exploring how the world could be pushed towards a ‘Hothouse Earth’ state, even with anthropogenic temperature rises as low as 2 ◦C (Steffen et al., 2018). The connection between climate change and biosphere integrity (the survival of complex adaptive ecosystems supporting diverse forms of life) is particularly strong. The IPCC is highly confident that climate change is adversely impacting terrestrial ecosystems, contributing to desertification and land degradation in many areas and changing the range, abundance and seasonality of many plant and animal species (Arneth et al., 2019). Similarly, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has reported that climate change is restricting the range of nearly half the world’s threatened mammal species and a quarter of threatened birds, with marine, coastal, and arctic ecosystems worst affected (Diaz et al., 2019). According to one estimate, climate change could cause 15–37 % of all species to become ‘**committed to extinction’** by mid-century (Thomas et al., 2004). Disruption to biosphere integrity can have profound economic and social repercussions, ranging from **loss of ecosystem services and natural resources** to the **destruction of traditional knowledge and livelihoods.** For instance, desertification, which threatens a quarter of Earth’s land area and a fifth of the population, is already estimated to cost developing nations 4–8 % of their GDP (United Nations, 2011). Many other rapid regime shifts involving loss of biosphere integrity have been observed, including shifts in arid vegetation, freshwater eutrophication, and the collapse of fish populations (Amano et al. 2020). There is a theoretical possibility of still more profound regime shifts at the global level (Rocha, Peterson, Bodin, & Levin, 2018). However, the contribution of loss of biosphere integrity to GCR is yet to be assessed. Kareiva and Carranza (2018) argue that it is unlikely to threaten human civilization, due both to a lack of plausible mechanisms for this threat and the fact that “local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses.” However, in their classification of GCRs, Avin et al. (2018) suggest the potential for ecological collapse to threaten the safety boundaries of multiple critical systems with diverse spread mechanisms at a range of scales, from the biogeochemical and anatomical to the ecological and sociotechnological. Note that both these studies were conducted for largely conceptual purposes and should not be taken as rigorous analyses of this risk, this topic warrants further investigation.

#### The alternative is a progressive counter-narrative of globalization and democratic investment in universal prosperity. This is the only way to prevent intensification of xenophobic violence and climate nationalism.

Karlsson 16 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “The Environmental Risks of Incomplete Globalization,” *Globalizations*, http://bit.ly/2jS3RNS]

Every year, more and more people travel by airplane and are able to experience other countries and cultures first-hand. As the world gets smaller, it is becoming increasingly difficult to deny our common humanity and insist on the artificial segregation of people based on mere geographical luck. Yet, in terms of politics or ideology, there has been surprisingly little interest in even imagining a world with universal freedom of movement and shared prosperity. It is reasonable to think that this disinterest in part derives from deeply entrenched Malthusian beliefs and fears of a coming climate crisis. Malthusian discourse often portrays global climate change as ultimate evidence of irresponsibility, greed or even the “cancer stage of capitalism” (Barry, 2012:138). Such descriptions show little tolerance for learning or humility with regard to the difficulties of the task. There has never been a blueprint for how to build a prosperous planetary civilisation or for how to achieve technological maturity in a way that does not destroy the biosphere. Yet, in a world of seven billion actually existing people, the question is where to go from here? As discussed above, to try to reverse the great structural processes of modernity through intentional localisation does not only seem wholly politically unrealistic, it is also most unlikely to actually deliver greater resilience or environmental sustainability. Yet, the problem of lacking realism is just as acute for those advocating breakthrough innovation or seeking to more fully integrate the world (Karlsson, 2013). In a time of public austerity, rising xenophobia, and an almost complete absence of realistic yet transformative visions at the global level, it is not surprising that climate nationalist responses have emerged as the default policy orientation. While these responses may at best slow the rate of warming, they offer little hope for the 3.5 billion people who currently lack access to modern energy and, as such, they are likely to contribute to the creation of new patterns of climate injustice. They are also problematic in the sense that for every year that a more meaningful response is delayed, the need for CDR grows. Already now, such negative emissions technology has become more or less a necessity for achieving the two degree target according to the scenarios represented in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) database (Anderson, 2015). Whereas breakthrough energy innovation could potentially offer a source of sustained global growth as energy would become significantly cheaper, CDR is always going to come at a net cost. If CDR eventually becomes unaffordable due to prolonged political procrastination and generally inefficient mitigation policies, it is likely that the political momentum will shift towards solar radiation management (SRM) and other more risky forms of climate engineering. Instead of fearfully backing into a warming future, there is an obvious need for bold and proactive political action (Garibaldi, 2014; Karlsson, 2016). Yet, as long as mitigation is perceived as a cost and something that runs counter to broader socio-economic goals, such action is unlikely. While accelerating the transition to a high-energy planet would undoubtedly put strong upward pressure on global emissions in the short run, it would also open up a political opportunity space for effective climate action that does not exist today. In a more equal and integrated world, there would be greater financial and human resources to combat climate change. Most of all, by providing a progressive account of globalisation, there would be a meaningful counter-narrative to both nationalist and neoliberal thinking. For some time it has become obvious that the welfare state stands at a disruptive juncture. Either it can try to protect itself from the world by imposing an international apartheid system as it falters under growing migratory pressure, rising costs for retirement, and a self-inflicted energy crisis or it can confront those fears with a politics of radical engagement and accelerate the transition to a world of universal affluence with an abundance of clean energy and open borders. Doing so would require reviving the belief in the public as an active political subject and defeating both neoliberal passivity and the divisive identity politics of contemporary environmentalism. To bring back high growth rates in the mature economies would require a fundamental reconfiguration away from supply-side economics to real wage growth, broad social investments, and accelerated modernisation (rather than as today, artificially delayed urbanisation and subsidies for low-productive jobs in rural economies). Finally, by providing universal welfare services, in particular education but also health care, social trust can be strengthened and corruption reduced (Rothstein, 2011) at the same time as the economy’s long-term growth potential can be increased. Yet, despite the remarkable scientific advancements of the last centuries, or even decades, Malthusians tend to reject the very possibility of universal affluence and what they pejoratively refer to as a “techno-fix” (Huesemann & Huesemann, 2011). Instead of uncertain technological innovation they like to see deep social changes, essentially a far-reaching epistemological homogenisation by which people everywhere adopt strict regimes of frugality and simplicity. However, just as the solution to the contradictions of capitalism in the 1930’s was neither individual moral reform of the capital-owners nor a socialist revolution of society as a whole but rather the institutionalisation of welfare-capitalism and liberal democracy, it seems far wiser to accept the existence of a pluralist society with competing conceptions of the good life and rather focus on applying technology in a conscious way to overcome environmental determinism. Obviously, this is also a question of political tactics. While ecosocialist literature tends to think of capitalism in the 21st century as a mere elite project, it seems fair to say that the logic of capital accumulation has become almost universal today with widely shared material aspirations reaching from home ownership to international travel. Similarly, large groups in the OECD-economies either have retired already or will do so in the coming decades with considerable expectations in terms of retirement income. Failure to deliver on these pension expectations would probably create a state of political crisis in which the “immigrants” but also the “environment” would be easy targets. For these, and many other reasons, it is not surprising that political elites remain deeply wedded to the idea of economic growth. Yet, insufficient demand due to rising inequality and a lack of social investments have made it difficult to deliver that growth. In the best of worlds, the need for growth could hypothetically make policy-makers more willing to challenge the prevailing supply-side paradigm but also consider the benefits of accelerating globalisation (or at least keeping them away from enacting protectionist measures). While it is obvious that economic growth does not benefit everyone equally, and that it can be source of environmental destruction, the same can be said about the lack of growth. A secular stagnation or even degrowth is certainly no guarantee for environmental protection or greater equality. If anything, the rich are likely to try to isolate themselves even more from the rest of society in case they feel threatened, in particular by moving overseas. It is also not surprising that the literature on degrowth has had almost nothing to say about how such strategies would play out at the international level (including what mechanisms that would be needed to prevent other states from taking military advantage of countries pursuing degrowth) or how exactly economic growth is to be “unlearned” at the micro level. Recognising the difficulties associated with imagining degrowth as an effective way of saving the global environment is not the same as defending “status quo” or embracing neoliberalism. As discussed above, it is the rather the failure of laissez-faire thinking that has made government intervention necessary to ensure both climate stability and a world with more equal opportunities. One common objection against climate innovation is that the real problem is not about limitations of renewable energy sources but about overcoming the entrenched interests of fossil industries. Yet, the fact that large multinational corporations such as ExxonMobil have vast political influence can also be seen as one of the reasons why technological change must be disruptive and go beyond, for instance,the scenariosin the IPCC database. Only by shocking markets through breakthrough innovation does it seem possible to break with the path dependence of existing energy systems in a way that would rapidly displace fossil fuels globally. In terms of strategy, it is also likely that fossil industries will be far more successful in thwarting the deployment of existing inferior technologies than in preventing a more general acceleration of science and technology, which would span multiple fields reaching from nanotechnology to basic physics (Victor, 2011:144) that are not immediately related to energy R&D and as such not subject to the same political economic constraints. In mainstream thinking, globalisation is primarily seen as a driver of environmental destruction as it disconnects “those who make decisions that generate ecological risks” from “the ecological victims who suffer” (Christoff & Eckersley, 2013:189). While few would dispute that globalisation has indeed contributed to the displacement of environmental harms as polluting industries have moved from rich to poor countries, a number of authors including Arthur Mol have argued that globalisation also has the potential of fostering environmental reform and facilitating ecological modernisation throughout the global economy (Mol, 2003). The aim of this paper has been to take that argument further yet by suggesting that the hope of an adequate response to many global environmental risks, and climate change in particular, in fact hinges on an accelerated rate of globalisation leading to economic convergence. A more equal and richer world would not only have better resources to deal with environmental stress and the need for climate adaptation, it would also compel policy-makers to actively pursue the development of breakthrough technologies that would once and for all resolve the climate/energy/population dilemma from the supply-side (Brook et al., 2014:2). By working from the supply-side rather than the demand-side, climate politics can finally be depolarised and the current logical schism between “believers” and “sceptics” can be overcome. Yet, it would be naïve to think that all would welcome a radicalisation of the modern project and the transition to a fully integrated high-energy planet. While such a future would probably reflect widely shared public aspirations to freedom of movement, material security, and environmental protection, cultural perfectionists are likely to decry the blandness of diversity in a world of open borders, eco-socialists are likely to see any “techno-fix” as merely a way of ducking responsibility for what they consider to be necessary social reforms, and libertarians are likely to criticise the government “overreach” implicit in the very notion of taking active responsibility for the global future. Another common objection against breakthrough innovation is that time is too short for fundamentally uncertain research. Such an objection would make perfect sense if there was any faster or safer route to restoring a safe climate and protecting the world against broader Anthropocene risks. This paper has argued that there is no such route, at least as long as the interests of people outside the OECD-countries are to be taken seriously. While sustained poverty abroad may seem to temporarily reduce the urgency of action, it will also lead to further lock-in of existing yet inferior technologies and increase the long-term need for CDR/SRM. The fundamental problem here is the scale illusion by which signals of relative local progress towards perceived “sustainability” overshadow other signals of absolute global failure. Just as the example of Iceland that currently has a 100% renewable electricity supply has not taken the world as a whole any closer to fossil independence, little if anything would be achieved if a handful of the world’s richest countries succeed in their transition to a nonscalable soft energy path. Yet, unfortunately, renewable energy but also the idea of “energy savings” continue to occupy a moral high-ground in the public imagination in ways that make meaningful action extremely difficult and obscure how much energy supply, but also overall consumption rates, must increase in the coming decades to ensure that everyone in the world has a chance of achieving a dignified livelihood. Essentially, by turning the traditional environmental idea of “intentional localisation” on its head, this paper has suggested that what most of all will determine humanity’s future in the Anthropocene is to what extent it will be possible to craft a new progressive narrative of global economic convergence capable of simultaneously overcoming Malthusian determinism and neoliberal ignorance of environmental realities. As Bruno Latour has noted, humanity has to learn to “love its monsters” rather than running away in panic from science and technology out of fear for the world that it has created (Latour, 2011). Only through a more conscious and reflexive relationship to technology is there any hope for humanity to realise its axiological potential (Bostrom, 2003) while building a world in which emancipative values, pluralism, and diversity can flourish.

#### The alt confronts the history of western colonialism and economic exploitation. A global Fordian compromise ensures oppressed people around the world the resources necessary to resist exploitation and flourish.

Karlsson 09 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “A global Fordian compromise? – And what it would mean for the transition to sustainability,” *Environmental Science & Policy* 12, http://bit.ly/2kfrsg6]

Though it may be simple to refute the normative and prescriptive elements of traditional green thought, we should be careful to think that we can do the same with its empirical analysis. The environmental problems are real and should indeed warrant radical political action. But any such action must first and foremost be based on the righteous claims for a decent life expressed by the developing world. Instead of seeing these claims as a threat to sustainability, the expansion of the global economy to the world’s poor should be seen as unique historic opportunity. Along those lines I will now delineate the idea of a global Fordian compromise. I will do this in a number of steps. First I will recapitulate the circumstances of the original ‘‘Fordian compromise’’. Then I will argue that even if economic globalization has been responsible for undermining the original compromise, the same forces may now be capable of renewing its relevance. With this in mind I will turn specifically to the agricultural sector and the European Union as an empirical illustration of how a global version of the compromise could work. By the early 1930s, the industrial countries were going through a deep and worsening recession. It seems correct to say that the crisis, at least to a large part, was caused by the very success of industrialism. The use of machinery and the division of labour had lead to a dramatic increase in productive capacity worldwide. At the same time, overall demand remained low, simply because the larger population could not afford to buy the goods that were produced. Historically, it had appeared rational for capital owners to keep wages as low as possible, to try to squeeze out that little extra marginal productivity through ever harsher conditions. This was also the analysis of Marx who thought that the declining rate of profit would lead to an increasing immiseration of the proletariat. Hence, for the more anarchistically inclined, the obvious solution was to overthrow the capital owners and divide their resources among the people. The problem with that approach however, was that the capitalists, albeit rich, were relatively few and the workers amounted to millions. What ensued, and what Marx famously did not foresee, was a new kind of compromise between capital owners and workers (Gourevitch, 1986, p. 128). In different countries, this compromise of so called ‘‘welfare capitalism’’ took on different shapes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In the U.S. it was initiated by the capital owners, most notably by Henry Ford, who realized that it would be in ~~his~~ [their] own self-interest to raise salaries and by doing so making it possible for his workers to buy what they produced in the factories. In the Scandinavian countries, the same compromise came about as industrialists and unionists agreed to a peace accord on the labour market under the condition that salaries would rapidly be increased. Whatever its manifestation, the different compromises were unified in that they gave both sides of the labour market a vested interest in the future by pointing towards the long-term benefits of co-operation. Though the full effects of this grand bargain could not be seen until the 1960s, the ‘‘Fordian compromise’’ of welfare capitalism was indisputable the engine behind one of the longest periods of economic growth ever experienced. As material conditions improved, extreme poverty became more or less eradicated in many Western countries. Especially the Scandinavian countries showed that it was possible to combine a growth oriented market economy with a strong welfare state, at least as long as the total economic product kept growing in real terms from year to year. By the 1970s however, belief in the compromise of welfare capitalism began to fade. Increasing economic globalization had meant that wage increases were only possible to the extent that they were matched by real gains in terms of productivity. As companies became more export oriented, the purchase power of the own population also became relatively less important. Beside these materialistic explanations, there was simultaneously an ideological shift to the right, a shift that left classical liberals morally corrupted by the perverse idea that their future wealth was dependent on having more poor people in their societies. A similar kind of perverse logic was also replicated onto the international level. As globalization and trade liberalization made it possible to buy electronics, textiles and other consumer goods for remarkably low prices, many people came to believe that their own good life was somehow dependent on the hard and underpaid work carried out in other parts of the world. What such a belief failed to recognize is that the global economy is not, and has never been, a zero-sum game. Though consumers in the rich countries may benefit in the short run from low salaries in the developing world, the same is not true if we look beyond the immediate present. Then their interest would be much better served if these countries were transformed into advanced industrial economies and billions of new consumers would enter the global market. If the historic experience from countries like Japan and South Korea has any bearing, this would translate into a ‘‘race to the top’’ as growing wealth would allow automation and the substitution of menial work, which would then even further increase overall productivity (and thus, overall demand). It is in particular this possibility of automation and robotization that dependency theorists have ignored when insisting that global capitalism, as a system, requires poverty to function. On a political level, protectionists have repeatedly failed to offer a compelling alternative to this progressive vision, especially for the longer run. Not only does it seem morally suspect to deny poor countries the possibilities of economic development, the effects of artificially high prices also have to be borne by the own population while the allocation of resources into uncompetitive industries means less room for overall economic growth even domestically. Nowhere is this more evident than in the agricultural sector. Though the European Union is not alone in this regard, I will here take the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union as my main empirical example to illustrate what a global Fordian compromise could look like. Initiated in the early 1960s, the CAP today represents 44% of the EU budget with a total of 60 billion USD scheduled in spending for 2008 (EU, 2008). The principal problem motivating the different subsidies and programmes of the CAP has been the high productive capacity of the European farmers. Left to their own, they would easily produce an enormous surplus of for instance grain, milk products and olive oil. In a normal economy, the effect of such a surplus would be a sharp drop in prices, forcing enough farmers out of business until the market would reach an equilibrium point where supply is matched by demand. Since the political price of such a ‘‘reset’’ (be it in votes, landscape aesthetics or food security) has been considered too high, the surplus production has instead been continuously taken away from the European market. Though it would have been possible to simply burn the surplus (as actually has been done occasionally in the U.S. Midwest), much of the European surplus has instead been exported on to the world market. However, since prices on the world market historically have been dramatically lower than prices inside the EU, this has in practical terms meant a large scale dumping of agricultural products on the world’s poor. At first, this may seem like a good thing. The European agricultural surplus has enabled for instance the urban population along the coasts of Africa to buy farm products of good quality, products that they otherwise would not have been able to afford. But as the population of Lagos, Abidjan and other growing cities have turned to food from Europe (which has been sold according to the ‘‘Ryanair-logic’’; better to get at least something than nothing) they have also turned away from domestic producers who find themselves unable to compete. Again, if the agricultural market would have been any other normal market, these African producers would of course have turned to Europe or other industrial countries with their products. However, and here we see the true cynicism of the current regime, this is not possible since one of the core mechanisms of CAP is precisely high tariffs on agricultural products entering the union. The import tariffs are set at a level that raises the World market price up to a ‘‘target’’ price consistent with that inside the union. Though attempts to reform the CAP are nearly as old the policy itself, and moderate progress has indeed been made as in the recent ‘‘decoupling’’ of subsidies (giving farmers less of an incentive to overproduce), the overall picture remains bleak (Goodison, 2007). Unfortunately, even the recent surge in food prices has been insufficient to stimulate larger investments as long as the high import tariffs of the rich world remain intact. Deprived of any chance of entering the world economy from below, and from thereon start building a capital base of their own, the African countries have instead found themselves increasingly dependent on different forms of development aid. Obviously, such cash handouts cannot replace indigenous growth and history suggests that they may often do more harm than good (Easterly, 2006). What motivates the CAP and similar policies is the very high discount rate by which the future is weighted against the present. Even if nearly all of the world’s economists agree that it would bring tremendous benefits to every country, and especially to the developing world, if the CAP and other regimes preventing free trade were torn down, the current path dependency may seem overwhelming. Calculations suggest that global free trade could generate benefits of up to $2.4 trillion annually. Despite this, the industrial countries have been backing into every new agreement on agricultural products and other goods in which the developing world holds a competitive advantage, as mostly recently seen in the stalled talks of the Doha Development Round. Given the apparent lack of political leadership based on an alternative long-term vision, we repeatedly see well-organized concentrated interests (such as the French farmers) prevailing over broader but more diffused ones. We do not have to look further than to the shores of Europe to see the practical implications of this failure. There, every year thousands of impoverished people drown as they make their desperate attempts to enter the ‘‘free world’’. What is needed, more than anything else, is pro-active political action. We have to take seriously the environmentalists’ claim that the future matters, but employ that insight to supersede the cynical trade-off that they implicitly and silently project. Just as capital owners and workers eventually came to understand that it was in their mutual long-term interest to co-operate, so must the interests of global development and environmental protection be aligned in a manner that opens up an optimistic vision of the future. To some this may sound like the very idea of ‘‘sustainable development’’, as outlined in the so-called Brundtland report of 1987 (WCED, 1987). It is. But since then we have come to realize that in order to be successful, the scope of ecological modernization must be far greater, up to the extent that it will be able to challenge the fundamental axioms of sustainability (Karlsson, 2007). At the same time, the ‘‘low energy paths’’ of the original report have been outstripped by the overwhelming demand of billions in Asia and elsewhere. It is no longer a question (as it was then) if these parts of the world will become industrialized or not, the question is rather by what means they will industrialize. Both China and India possess abundant reserves of coal. In fact, China alone has enough coal to sustain its economic growth for a century or more (Fairley, 2007). Unless breakthrough technologies, such as nuclear fusion, are made readily available, it is most likely that these countries will start burning their coal reserves on a massive scale, rapidly undermining any effort to reduce carbon emissions. Already last year, China became the largest source of carbon emissions worldwide. These alarming trends, should if nothing else, emphasize the need for radical investment in research and development. This brings us back to the Fordian compromise and the present situation with regard to trade and development. Within the framework of forward-looking progressive politics, it should be recognized that the advanced industrial countries have a specific moral responsibility to reduce their environmental impact (Hayward, 2007). But unlike in traditional green thinking, that incurred ‘‘ecological debt’’ is not be paid through reduced economic activity or, as often has been suggested in more radical literature, by some sort of ‘‘wealth transfer’’. To play the historic parallel a bit further, that would be the equivalent of asking a capitalist in the 1930s to give out his money and join the working class in their suffering. Morally commendable as such an action certainly would have been, it would obviously be foolish to base the hope of social development on its realization. By the same token, we should not let the hope of environmental sustainability rest with environmental citizenship or some ‘‘great awakening’’ by the time a global climate catastrophe sets in. Instead, the moral responsibility consists in compelling the half-hearted liberals of Europe and elsewhere to actually live up to what they teach in the economic classes. Witnessing the raise of China, South Korea and the wider Pacific Rim, it should be beyond reasonable doubt that the liberal market economy is uniquely equipped to lift billions out of poverty. Considering the number of successful economic transformations that the advanced industrial countries themselves have gone through over the last century, it should also be clear that the path to the future should be one that embraces openness, innovation and competition. Applying this to the case of the CAP, we should see the unique chance of striking a grand bargain by which the rich countries accept to wither the storm as their markets are open to competition. Following a removal of all barriers preventing free trade, the developed economies could initiate the long overdue transfer of resources from agriculture to scientific research. At the same time, the poor countries of the world would finally be able to begin walking the long road towards modernization, a road on which they have been held back for centuries, first by colonialism and then by the collective clientelism encouraged by the international development aid establishment. In line with a global Fordian compromise, that economic development would raise the purchasing power of the poor. Part of that purchasing power would be directed towards the already rich countries, allowing them to reap the benefits of trade and put even more money into technological development and socially progressive politics. Combined, it is likely that the total amount of resources will be sufficient to open up advanced technological paths to global environmental sustainability. Further examining the bargaining situation, we see that failing to reach such a compromise would worsen international tensions, keeping the industrial countries in their oppressing role in which short-term gains are bought at the expense of long-term possibilities. Moreover, and if airy cosmopolitan arguments are insufficient to persuade us about our shared destiny, we have to remember that if poor states are allowed to fail they stand the risk of becoming breeding grounds for terror and extremism, all imposing skyrocketing costs for ‘‘security’’ on the developed world. Thus, though the analogy with the striking working class of the original compromise may not be perfect, the rich countries should have a strong incentive to listen to the warning sounds coming from the ‘‘lower decks’’.

## Case

### 1NC – Adversarialism

#### Debate is a competitive activity which requires a winner and loser. That binaristic choice is inevitable and not solved by the aff- adversarial structures of debate turns aff solvency

Atchison and Panetta ‘9 [Jarrod Atchison, Director of Debate @ Trinity University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate @ the University of Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, p. 317-34 //liam]

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus **encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem**. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.¶ If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed.¶ From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

#### The ballot is a poor vehicle for change---wins-as-solidary are an extrinsic incentive, which fails and corrodes more effective intrinsic motivations

Kohn 93 – Alfie Kohn, MA in Social Sciences from the University of Chicago, BA from Brown University, internally quoting Edward L. Deci, Professor of Psychology and Gowen Professor in the Social Sciences at the University of Rochester, No Contest: The Case Against Competition, p. 59-60

The idea that trying to do well and trying to do better than others may work at cross-purposes can be understood in the context of an issue addressed by motivational theorists. We do best at the tasks we enjoy. An outside or extrinsic motivator (money, grades, the trappings of competitive success) simply cannot take the place of an activity we find rewarding in itself. "While extrinsic motivation may affect performance," wrote Margaret Clifford, "performance is dependent upon learning, which in turn is primarily dependent upon intrinsic motivation." More specifically, "a significant performance-increase on a highly complex task will be dependent upon intrinsic motivation."59 In fact, even people who are judged to be high in achievement motivation do not perform well unless extrinsic motivation has been minimized, as several studies have shown.60

Competition works just as any other extrinsic motivator does. As Edward Deci, one of the leading students of this topic, has written, "The reward for extrinsically motivated behavior is something that is separate from and follows the behavior. With competitive activities, the reward is typically 'winning' (that is, beating the other person or the other team), so the reward is actually extrinsic to the activity itself."51 This has been corroborated by subjective reports: people who are more competitive regard themselves as being extrinsically motivated.62 Like any other extrinsic motivator, competition cannot produce the kind of results that flow from enjoying the activity itself.

But this tells only half the story. As research by Deci and others has shown, the use of extrinsic motivators actually tends to undermine intrinsic motivation and thus adversely affect performance in the long run. The introduction of, say, monetary reward will edge out intrinsic satisfaction; once this reward is withdrawn, the activity may well cease even though no reward at all was necessary for its performance earlier. Money "may work to 'buy off one's intrinsic motivation for an activity. And this decreased motivation appears (from the results of the field experiment) to be more than just a temporary phenomenon."63 Extrinsic motivators, in other words, are not only ineffective but corrosive. They eat away at the kind of motivation that *does* produce results.

This effect has been shown specifically with competition. In a 1981 study, eighty undergraduates worked on a spatial relations puzzle. Some of them were asked to try to solve it more quickly than the penons sitting next to them, while others did not have to compete. The subjects then sat alone (but clandestinely observed) for a few minutes in a room that contained a similar puzzle. The time they voluntarily spent working on it, together with a self-report on how interested they had been in solving the puzzle, constituted the measure of intrinsic interest. As predicted, the students who had been competing were less intrinsically motivated than those who had originally worked on the puzzle in a noncompetitive environment. It was concluded that

trying to beat another party is extrinsic in nature and tends to decrease people's intrinsic motivation for the target activity. It appears that when people are instructed to compete at an activity, they begin to see that activity as an instrument for winning rather than an activity which is mastery-oriented and rewarding in its own right. Thus, competition seems to work like many other extrinsic rewards in that, under certain circumstances, it tends to be perceived as controlling and tends to decrease intrinsic motivation.114

#### Impacts about debate and the assumption that winning ballots has political force to solve ­­­­rhetoric in debate is bourgeois ideology – to think that ballots in Round 1 of the Wake tournament can change material conditions is inseparable from magical voluntarism.

Cloud and Gunn 10 (Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20 (2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association//shree)

Over a decade ago anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff (1999) advanced the provocative thesis that globalization in late capitalism has led to ‘‘a dramatic intensification . . . of appeals to enchantment,’’ often most discernable in industrializing countries such as South Africa (p. 282). From ‘‘get rich quick’’ pyramid schemes to e-mail promises from millionaire widows in Nigeria, ‘‘capitalism has an effervescent new spirit—a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist—welling up close to its core’’ (p. 281). Of course, over a half-century ago Theodor Adorno (1994) inveighed against astrology and soothsaying as indices of economic magic, underscoring the ability of capitalism to promote the ‘‘doctrine of the existence of spirit’’ so central to bourgeois consciousness. ‘‘In the concept of mind-in-itself,’’ argued Adorno, ‘‘consciousness has ontologically justified and perpetuated privilege by making it independent of the social principle by which it is constituted. Such ideology explodes in occultism: It is Idealism come full circle’’ (p. 133).What the Comaroffs point to is not the arrival of a new form of magical thinking, then, but the intensification and proliferation of postenlightenment gullibility via globalization—ironically in what is presumably the age of cynical reason (e.g., Sloterdijk, 1987). As human beings, academics are just as susceptible to magical thinking and narcissistic fantasies of omnipotence as everyone else. Perhaps because at some level of communication scholars tend to entertain a sense of the magical in the idea of communication (see Peters, 1999), we have been particularly prone to a philosophical belief in what we term ‘‘magical voluntarism,’’ the notion that human agency is better understood as the ability to control a given phenomenon through the proper manipulation of thoughts and symbols (e.g., language). Going well beyond the straightforward idea that our thoughts necessarily influence our actions in transforming the world around us, what we are calling magical voluntarism fosters a deliberate misrecognition of material recalcitrance, an inability to recognize the structural, political, economic, cultural, and psychical limits of an individual’s ability to act in her own interests. Furthermore, magical voluntarism refuses to acknowledge that there is a limit to the efficacy of symbolic action, beyond which persuasion and thought alone fail to shift existing social relations. In popular culture, magical voluntarism is typified by the bestselling book and DVD The Secret (Byrne, 2006; Heriot, 2006), which teach the reader/viewer that ‘‘[y]our life right now is a reflection of your thoughts. That includes all great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life, because that is what you experienced’’ (Byrne, 2006, p. 9). The ‘‘magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist’’ typified by the raging success of The Secret (see McGee, 2007) indicates that enchantment is not limited to developing countries, but is also a crowning achievement of late capitalism in the postindustrial world. Nor is magical thinking limited to popular culture. As a recent essay in this journal by Sonja K. Foss, William J. Waters, and Bernard J. Armada (2007) demonstrates, magical thinking has some purchase in the field of communication studies (see also Geisler, 2005; Villadsen, 2008).1 According to Foss, Waters, and Armada, human agency is simply a matter of consciously choosing among differing interpretations of reality. We argue that the understanding of agency advanced by Foss, Waters, and Armada is informed by the same voluntarist ideology that has enchanted The Secret’s millions of readers. Below we advance a conception of agency as an open question in order to combat magical thinking in contemporary communication theory. Although we approach the concept of agency from different theoretical standpoints (one of us from the perspective of psychoanalysis, the other, classical Marxism), we are mutually opposed to the (bourgeois) idealism of magical voluntarism in recent work in communication and rhetorical studies on agency.2 Our primary vehicle of argument is a critique of Foss, Waters, and Armada’s essay, ‘‘Toward a Theory of Agentic Orientation: Rhetoric and Agency in Run Lola Run,’’ which represents a magical-voluntaristic brand of practical reason (phronesis) that is increasingly discredited among a number rhetorical scholars. We are particularly alarmed by the suggestion that even in ‘‘situations’’ such as ‘‘imprisonment or genocide . . . agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency . . . [which] opens up opportunities for innovating . . . in ways unavailable to those who construct themselves as victims’’ (p. 33). The idea that one can choose an ‘‘agentic orientation’’ regardless of context and despite material limitation not only ignores two decades of research within the field of communication studies on agency and its limitations (and is thus ‘‘regressive’’ in more than one sense), but tacitly promotes a belief in wish-fulfillment through visualization and the imagination, as well as a commitment to radical individualism and autonomy. As a consequence, embracing magical voluntarism leads to narcissistic complacency, regressive infantilism, and elitist arrogance.

### 1NC - Academy

#### Positioning within the structure of debate and the academy subverts the radical intentions of the Aff – their resistance becomes an object of surveillance and consumption which means they effect no new theoretical lexicons

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

### 1NC- Turn

#### Well-regulated capitalism is possible, sustainable, and solves every existential threat – inaction keeps systems vulnerable and sacrifices millions to irreversible poverty – turns elitism

Budolfson 21 (Mark Budolfson, Assistant Professor in the Department of Environmental and Occupational Health and Justice at the Rutgers School for Public Health and Center for Population–Level Bioethics., 5-7-2021, Arguments for Well-Regulated Capitalism, and Implications for Global Ethics, Food, Environment, Climate Change, and Beyond, Cambridge Core, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/arguments-for-wellregulated-capitalism-and-implications-for-global-ethics-food-environment-climate-change-and-beyond/96F422D04E171EECDEF77312266AE9DD>) MAM

The Argument for Well-Regulated Capitalism

However, things are more complicated than the arguments above would suggest, and the benefits of capitalism, especially for the world's poorest and most vulnerable people, are in fact myriad and significant. In addition, as we will see in this section, many experts argue that **capitalism is not the fundamental cause** of the previously described problems but rather **an essential component of the best solutions** to them and of the best methods for promoting our goals of health, well-being, and justice.

To see where the defenders of capitalism are coming from, consider an analogy involving a response to a pandemic: if a country administered a rushed and untested vaccine to its population that ended up killing people, we would not say that vaccines were the problem. Instead, the problem would be the flawed and sloppy policies of vaccine implementation. Vaccines might easily remain absolutely essential to the correct response to such a pandemic and could also be essential to promoting health and flourishing, more generally.

The argument is similar with capitalism according to the leading mainstream arguments in favor of it: Capitalism is an essential part of the best society we could have, just like vaccines are an essential part of the best response to a pandemic such as COVID-19. But of course both capitalism and vaccines can be implemented poorly, and can even do harm, especially when combined with other incorrect policy decisions. But **that does not mean** that **we** should **turn against them**—quite the opposite. **Instead, we should embrace them as essential** to the best and most just outcomes for society, and educate ourselves and others on their importance and on how they must be properly designed and implemented with other policies in order to best help us all. In fact, the argument in favor of capitalism is even more dramatic because it claims that much more is at stake than even what is at stake in response to a global pandemic—what is at stake with capitalism is nothing less than whether the world's poorest and most vulnerable billion people **will remain in conditions of poverty and oppression, or** if they will instead finally **gain access to** what is minimally necessary for **basic health and wellbeing** and become increasingly affluent and empowered. The argument in favor of capitalism proceeds as follows:

Premise 1. Development and the past. Over the course of recorded human history, the majority of historical **increases in health, wellbeing, and justice have occurred** in the last two centuries, largely **as a result of societies adopting** or moving toward **capitalism**. Capitalism is a relevant cause of these improvements, in the sense that they could not have happened to such a degree if it were not for capitalism and would not have happened to the same degree **under any alternative** noncapitalist approach to structuring society. The argument in support of this premise relies on observed relationships across societies and centuries between indicators of degree of capitalism, wealth, investments in public goods, and outcomes for health, wellbeing, and justice, together with econometric analysis in support of the conclusion that the best explanation of these correlations and the underlying mechanism is that large increases in health, wellbeing, and justice are largely driven by increasing investments in public goods. The scale of increased wealth necessary to maximize these investments requires capitalism. Thus, as capitalist societies have become dramatically wealthier over the past hundred years (and wealthier than societies with alternative systems), this has allowed larger investments in public goods, which simply has not been possible in a sustained way in societies without the greater wealth that capitalism makes possible. Important investments in public goods include investments in basic medical knowledge, in health and nutrition programs, and in the institutional capacity and know-how to regulate society and capitalism itself. As a result, capitalism is a primary driver of positive outcomes in health and wellbeing (such as increased life expectancy, lowered child and maternal mortality, adequate calories per day, minimized infectious disease rates, a lower percentage and number of people in poverty, and more reported happiness);5 and in justice (such as reduced deaths from war and homicide; higher rankings in human rights indices; the reduced prevalence of racist, sexist, homophobic opinions in surveys; and higher literacy rates).6 These quantifiable positive consequences of global capitalism **dramatically outweigh the negative consequences** (such as deaths from pollution in the course of development), with the result that the net benefits from capitalism in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice have been greater than they would have been under any known noncapitalist approach to structuring society.7

Premise 2. Economics, ethics, and policy. Although capitalism has often been ill-regulated and therefore failed to maximize net benefits for health, wellbeing, and justice, it **can become well-regulated** so that it maximizes these societal goals, by including mechanisms identified by economists and other policy experts that do the following:

**optimally regulate negative effects such as pollution and monopoly power**, and invest in public goods such as education, basic healthcare, and fundamental research including biomedical knowledge (more generally, policies that correct the failures of free markets that economists have long recognized will arise from “externalities” in the absence of regulation);9

ensure equity and distributive justice (for example, via wealth redistribution);10

ensure basic rights, justice, and the rule of law independent of the market (for example, by an independent judiciary, bill of rights, property rights, and redistribution and other legislation to correct historical injustices due to colonialism, racism, and correct current and historical distortions that have prevented markets from being fair);11 and

ensure that there is no alternative way of structuring society that is more efficient or better promotes the equity, justice, and fairness goals outlined above (by allowing free exchange given the regulations mentioned).12

To summarize the implication of the first two premises, well-regulated capitalism is essential to best achieving our ethical goals—which is true even though capitalism has certainly not always been well regulated historically. **Society can still do much better** and remove the large deficits in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice that exist under the current inferior and imperfect versions of capitalism.

#### Only solution to climate change – responsive to international crises.

Bosch and Schmidt 19 (Stephan, Institute of Geography, Chair for Human Geography, University of Augsburg, and Matthias, Institute of Geography, Chair for Human Geography, University of Augsburg, “Is the post-fossil era necessarily post-capitalistic? – The robustness and capabilities of green capitalism”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 161, July) DB

Concerning the second dimension of criticism, Section 4 illustrates how the rejection of green capitalism overlooks promising approaches to surmounting the environmental crisis. On the one hand, we argue that in face of the given narrow time slot as well as the prevailing political strategies, it is more realistic and pragmatic to primarily assess the efficiency of market-oriented solutions. Even though in principle we take sufficiency to have the best effectiveness regarding the solution of ecological and social problems, we still do not count on people's willingness to live in greater moderation within due time. On the other hand, we therefore presume that there are no other suitable economic frame conditions for surmounting the crisis than those offered by the capitalist social order. This perspective is based on the assumption that innovations, which above all emanate from thriving economies (Wangler, 2013), are highly relevant for overcoming the environmental crisis. As growth, innovation, and the development of new industries are to be seen as directly related to the export sector as well as the utilisation of comparative advantages (Bathelt and Glückler, 2012), we therefore also strictly object to the concept of autonomy. Moreover, we take innovation and the aspects of growth, entrepreneurship, and democratic processes of negotiation related to it (cf. Gailing et al., 2013; Walter and Gutscher, 2013; Raven et al., 2016), to be essential for the implementation of regenerative energy systems and social welfare (Iversen, 2005; Nasirov et al., 2017). Our presumption that innovations occur more likely and more frequently within a capitalist, than in alternative social orders (e.g. Harris, 2013: socialist markets), is derived from Schumpeter's notion of competitive capitalism, which he distinctly sets apart from trustified capitalism. Competitive capitalism is about fertile destructive impulses emanating from enthusiastic entrepreneurs who are ready to take risks, and act solution-oriented. These impulses may revolutionise the economic process: “This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism” (Schumpeter, 2009). Based on Schumpeter's ‘theory of economic development’ (cf. Herzog and Honneth, 2016; Schumpeter, 1994; Schumpeter, 2009) – which, according to Marques (2008), represents the original idea of innovation-driven capitalism – we analyse capitalism's robustness to the downfall of fossil energy; moreover, we investigate its potential contributions to ecologic sustainability. Yet we want to go beyond Schumpeter's perspective, which fixes on the entrepreneur, and take a closer look at the role of state policy in Section 5. Our argument is that creative entrepreneurs and markets alone will not suffice to specifically and quickly initiate the change of the energy system driven by innovation. We state the thesis that an active role of the state is needed which relies on political continuity when it comes to promoting environmental innovation and creates stable institutional frame conditions. In a last step, we will show that during the deployment of regenerative energy systems, social aspects have hitherto been given too little attention by actors of state and politics and that national objectives were uncoupled from local contexts. To achieve a successful low-carbon transition, these deficits need to be corrected. In principle, this seems possible, as market-economically oriented regenerative energy systems have often been the result of open-minded democratic negotiations. In Section 6, the findings of the study will be summarised. 2. The crisis of fossil energies and capitalism Energy sources are a central element of humankind's materialistic history and elementary changes in the relevance of energy carriers have always led to extensive economic and societal transformations (Bridge et al., 2013). Exemplarily, the drastic increase in productivity during industrialisation cannot be explained without the revolutionary change of the energy system towards fossil fuels (Osterhammel, 2011). Ever since, economic growth is accompanied by an increasing consumption of finite energy resources and non-energetic primary materials (Altvater, 2005). Accordingly, questions of economic development must always be regarded in the context of the energy system, as well as the circulation of energetic and non-energetic crude materials within it (Meadows et al., 2004). Altvater (2007) takes the relationship between humans and nature to be crisis-laden because a limited stock of energy resources within the Earth's thin crust forms the basis of the present economic system. This limitation implied grave consequences for the global ecology. The apparently crisis-laden interrelation of nature and economy is also highlighted in ‘Anthropocene or Capitolocene?’ edited by Moore (2016), in which the impacts of capitalism are regarded as significant enough to be marked as their own geochronological era. The main point of criticism is capitalism's orientation to industrial scaling and quantitative growth (Mathews, 2011), which likely will end abruptly once Earth's limited capacities will have been depleted by the exponential growth of population and economy (Daly, 1995). Yet not only the finiteness of energy carriers, but also the accumulation of extreme meteorological incidents, mass mortality of species, and sea level rise represent impediments of stable economic growth (McCarthy, 2015). The scenarios concerning trends of the world's condition developed by the Club of Rome illustrate that keeping a high wealth level can only be accomplished if a radical change in societal attitude concerning the valuation of growth will take effect (Meadows et al., 2004). Stopping environmental destruction while maintaining the present economic system appears to be impossible, since fossil energy carriers provide globally acting companies with the opportunity to spatially separate production and consumption as well as to externalise the manifold ecological expenses (Chisholm, 1990). Bridge (2010) rates the heated debates about Peak Oil as ecologically motivated forebodings of a new energy order in which the modern industrial nations are going to free themselves of their dependence on oil. For Neomarxist groups, the end of the age of mineral oil even represents an apocalyptic turn of eras during which nature were going to take vengeance on the ecological arrogance of capitalism. According to Bettini and Karaliotas (2013), the narration of Peak Oil thereby attains a symbolism that reaches far beyond mathematical calculations of the scarcity of fossil energy sources, being extended to a general criticism of a system that is exclusively oriented on growth. McCarthy (2015) sees the chance of a post-fossil capitalism especially in the commodification of wind, sunlight, geothermal heat, and waves. This way, nature would again be introduced into the cycle of capital. Van den Bergh (2011) presumes that this may be a practicable approach, perceiving criticism of market economy and capitalism as too radical and warns of one-sidedly problematising growth without simultaneously pointing out realisable alternative ways. He therefore prefers the ‘a-growth-concept’, which assumes a neutral position on growth, trying to create social as well as ecological sustainability by means of pricing policy, environmental agreements, and education initiatives. The commodification of nature, however, is rejected by the degrowth movement, as the comparison of the Montreal Protocol, which is based on regulations (ozone) with the Kyoto Protocol based on trade had shown a greater effectiveness of regulative measures (Kallis, 2011). Concerning the market's capabilities, North (2010) additionally speaks of the neoliberal enthusiasts' mindless faith in technology, who were mistakenly convinced that creative destruction is sufficient to face the societal challenges posed by Peak Oil and the climate crisis. Sarkar and Kern (2008) limit the possibilities of the global community's further development to the two options ‘eco socialism’ or ‘barbarism’. This rhetoric stylises capitalism as the image of the enemy: on the one hand, it represents the cause of the global ecological crisis due to the exploitation of natural resources – and for that reason alone were not to be maintained (Daly, 2005) – while on the other hand not offering a suitable social framework for mastering the crisis (Kallis et al., 2009). Hence, the development of a symbiotic economy (Garcia-Olivares and Sole, 2015) rooted beyond obsessive economic growth (Buch-Hansen, 2018) is promoted. Renewable energies were apt to meet these requirements since they can be developed through collaborative bottom-up mechanisms on a communal level, therefore enabling the decentralisation and democratisation of energy supply (Rifkin, 2013). In fact, this may be an option. However, in the following, we want to demonstrate that capitalism is not only very robust to crises, but is also able to contribute to the solution of the environmental crisis. 3. Robustness of capitalism 3.1. Space-time compression We will now show that the possibility of increasing productivity does not end with the transition to a regenerative energy system, but only needs to be embedded into new logistic-infrastructural contexts. In this, we contradict Altvater (2007), Huber (2009) and North (2010), who claim that capitalism could expand only on the basis of fossil fuels, since, due to the global transportability of oil, gas, and coal, entrepreneurial actions are no longer bound to the local availability of energy resources, but range globally. Furthermore, the usage of fossil energy carriers is not subject to daily or seasonal fluctuations. Transportability and baseload capacity hence lead to space-time compression (Harvey, 1996), as products can be generated in ever shorter intervals of time. Following this logic, the limitation of the fossil resource basis inevitably brings about the end of the capitalistic system. It remains undisputed that energy flow within a solar-based energy system is hard to control (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). Most forms of renewable energies are intermittent sources, whose contribution to the energy mix are subject to the rhythms of sun, wind, precipitation, and tides (Fares, 2015). Adapting energy production to demand, a fundamental prerequisite of continuous economic growth, thus becomes a major challenge. What Altvater (2007), Huber (2009) and North (2010) actually do not include in their considerations, are the numerous technological innovations for the stabilisation of regenerative energy systems. After all, with biomass and geothermal power, two energy carriers capable of providing base load are at hand (Matek and Gawell, 2015), which may, in the form of regenerative combined power plants, support the weather-dependent energy sources sun and wind (Palensky and Dietrich, 2011; Ramchurn et al., 2011). The numerous energy storage technologies are also important, albeit only few of these have reached industrial maturity. In principle, mechanical, chemical, electrical, or thermal kinds of storage are being discerned (Hadjipaschalis et al., 2009). Compressed air and pumped storage power plants with efficiency levels of up to 80% are especially promising (Anagnostopoulos and Papantonis, 2008). Research is also conducted on the conversion of surplus regenerative power into methane or hydrogen (Jensen et al., 2007), by which the bidirectional operation of the power and gas network is made possible, allowing for transportability as well as baseload capacity within large spatial units. Space-time availability may also be augmented by the development and capacity expansion of high-voltage transmission lines (Walter and Bosch, 2013). Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) have pointed out at an early point, that the existent grids, having been developed following a monopolistic logic, are outdated and incapable of integrating decentrally-produced electricity with strong fluctuations. These deficits, however, are successively being corrected. E.g., Germany's South, which is poor in wind but strong in terms of industry is being provided with direct access to the big wind energy off-shore potentials in the North as well as to the storage power plants in Scandinavia (cf. Fig. 1). The possibilities of intercontinental power transport from regenerative sources have been thoroughly investigated by DLR (2006) and Grossmann et al. (2014). Both energy storage and the development of the power grid thus will successively reverse the present space-time limitations of regenerative energy systems. The two domains, however, are not isolated from one another, but are coordinated via smart grids. Solomon and Krishna (2011) emphasise that smart grids are superbly suitable for the implementation of market-based approaches, so that an innovation-driven mass market for energy efficiency technologies could be anticipated. Smart grids also provide the possibility of no longer designing the mass production of renewable energy technologies on a fossil basis, but by the usage of renewable energy. While the production of the first generation of regenerative technologies was based on fossil energy, in future, the possibilities of energy storage, the almost unlimited energy potential of a solar-based economy, and the combination of both aspects through smart grids will ensure the flexible provision of regenerative energy at every production site without limits of time. Yet in order to optimise the flows of energy and material in smart grids, concepts of closed crude material cycles are needed, which, in the sense of the cradle-to-cradle approach (cf. Section 4), allow the reintroduction of used materials (e.g. old wind power plants made of renewable resources) to the biosphere. Thus, the problem of externalisation of ecological costs can be minimised. Summing up, the increase of productivity and stable economic growth within regenerative energy systems seems possible. Still, it remains to be emphasised that large-scale energy projects also entail negative social consequences. E.g., Yenneti et al. (2016) have shown that the Charanka solar park in Gujarat, India, was erected on areas that the local population's livelihood had depended on for decades. The refuse of access to these areas, as well as the inhabitants' successive dispossession through state measures thus are direct results of the Indian economy's ecological modernisation (Levien, 2013). In this context, Baka (2013) speaks of “energy dispossessions”, a phenomenon which has also been observed with large-scale wind energy parks (Avila, 2018; Cowell, 2010). The socio-material impact of economic modernisation on the local population, whose lives strongly depend on agricultural land use, are often insufficiently respected (Yenneti et al., 2016), so that the dubious impression was given that environmental protection and economic growth based on efficient technologies, competition, and state measures could go with one another without social side effects. Remarkably, the controversial energy mega-projects especially in the global South, are not the cause of the development of new power asymmetries and conflicts, but rather reproduce and harden long-standing social disparities and injustices (Avila, 2018). According to Bradley and Hedrén (2014), a low-carbon transition hence misses its aims if it is only about modernising the energy system without likewise transforming the underlying social structures. 3.2. Crisis as an element of capitalist social order We hold the view that the occurrence of crises in capitalism is not due to it being an ailing, doomed economic order; nor is it a proof of capitalism's ineptitude for meeting ecological challenges. Instead, we deem that crisis is a fundamental element of the capitalist social order that actually provides a chance for readjusting economic processes. Harvey (2011) explains that anything blocking the circulation and accumulation of capital may pose a threat to the capitalist system and induce a fundamental crisis. The finiteness of fossil fuels is a crisis of this kind (McCarthy, 2015). Altvater (2007) is convinced that capitalism will not be able to overcome this crisis; therefore, future technologic progress had to be embedded in a non-fossil, non-capitalist framework. Kallis (2011) also emphasises that the approach to a steady state (cf. Daly, 1991, Daly, 2005) will transform the institutional preconditions of property, work, banking, and distribution to such an extent that in the end, it will be impossible to still identify them as capitalistic. With regard to Kallis' doubts concerning the institutional robustness of capitalism, Schumpeter points out that precisely the ups and downs of industrial development, which are the outcomes of successful innovations' intensifying competition, enable progress (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). As crises therefore represent an immanent part of the capitalist system, an environmental and resources-related crisis caused by the capitalistic process does not provide sufficient evidence to suggest a possible downfall of the capitalistic social order. The crisis might even be taken as proof of an economic cycle, if it is regarded as a period of depression between the dwindling fossil and the emerging regenerative age. Böhm et al. (2012) and McCarthy (2015) confirm that capitalism is capable of overcoming even fundamental crises, actually using these as starting points of its further expansion. Concerning the environmental crisis, Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) also concede that the deployment of renewable energies holds the potential of founding a new form of capitalism that is characterised by a much lower degree of materialistic lavishness. Bettini and Karaliotas (2013) emphasise that from a neo-liberal point of view, the accusation of capitalism bringing about a resources-related and environmental crisis does not at all provoke self-doubts. Rather, it caused the profitable marketing of adequate approaches to solutions in the field of resource depletion and environmental impacts to move into economic focus. Even Altvater (2007) points out that the externalised effects of production and consumption on nature become relevant for companies once they jeopardise profitability and accumulation. In that case, environmental problems and their solutions can actually be made part of capitalist logic. Solomon and Krishna (2011) are convinced that in order to solve the environmental crisis, it were not even necessary to achieve further technologic breakthroughs, as the technologies needed for the remodeling of society towards energy efficiency were already mature and cost-efficient. Even if capitalism might be sufficiently robust, Kallis (2011) still takes the crisis as a chance to break up obstructive social and political lock-ins that have hitherto seemed unalterable and have lead into the crisis. Yet he does not regard the ability of social and political transformation to be inherent in the traits of market, but as a characteristic of a social order orientated towards degrowth. Certainly, Kallis is right in saying that the market is hard to control, making a concerted transformation towards sustainability difficult. Still his criticism only refers to that form of capitalism which Schumpeter characterised as trustified capitalism and which does lead to ecologically problematic lock-in effects. The criticism cannot, however, be applied to competitive capitalism, which generates those basic innovations giving rise to the revolutionary crises described as so fertile by Kallis (2011). Thus, an opportunity is provided for alternative social conditions to be brought about – but within the capitalist social order – and for substantiating these new conditions through further innovations. Innovations may emerge outside of competition and market economy, but will then lack the required frequency and force, as growth represents the most important incentive of innovation (Wangler, 2013). On the other hand, a continuous process of innovation again leads to growth, which may revolutionise the present social conditions, as Schumpeter states (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Thereby, a new combination of the given means of production within new sites of production emerges, generating new goods, methods, and markets. Productive resources are applied to hitherto untested usages while being withdrawn from those usages they served before (Geels, 2011). What Kallis (2011) terms technological optimism with regard to the ecological innovative power of capitalism, is therefore technological realism in the context of Schumpeter's competitive capitalism. Without doubt, innovative boosts on the part of already established companies are also conceivable and may give rise to the possibility of maintaining trustified capitalism with its ecologically precarious structures. An example hereof is the innovation ‘Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage’, by which the ecological impact of the emission intensive electrical conversion of coal is being reduced (Benson and Orr, 2008). Technological progress may hence stabilise the existent system of economy and policy that is accountable for the environmental crisis (Bettini and Karaliotas, 2013). In Schumpeter's view, however, the decisive economic order is competitive capitalism, which is characterised by the aggressive economic demeanour of new, innovative enterprises economically challenging the establishment (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). The start-ups of new companies, which are inseparably connected with the processes of innovation, withdraw production goods from the present capitalist system by underbidding, disturbing the former economic balance that is so destructive for nature. Competition is therefore essential for overcoming the environmental crisis. In that respect, the concept of ‘solidary economics’ and its precept of surmounting the allegedly ruthless principle of competition and emancipating oneself from the logic of the markets (Embshoff and Giegold, 2008), is counterproductive, as the renunciation of competition impedes the breakup of crusted economic structures, which thus continue to harm the environment. After all, the big energy providers' strategy was and is to hold on to the fossil-nuclear power plant pool for as long as possible, suppressing alternative concepts of energy supply (Gawel et al., 2012). A radical transformation of the energy system therefore cannot emerge from the existent structures, as Schumpeter assesses (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Instead, innovative processes emerge outside of the old major companies until proceeding to attack the incumbent regime through the rededication of means of production (Geels, 2011). Innovative marketing strategies of small and middle scale businesses supplanting cumbersome large companies play an essential part especially in the field of renewable energies (Walsh, 2012). In this, competition is a decisive element that cannot easily be superseded. 4. Capabilities of green capitalism A competitive green capitalism develops great creativity by its high rate of innovation, which may also reinvent the relationship between humans and nature. We now want to exemplify how this might be brought about. Schumpeter holds the view that innovation is the result of the capitalistic entrepreneurial spirit, not the other way round (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Technological and social progress hence are no independent variables materialising out of thin air, but arise from the logic of the capitalist process. Meadows et al. (2004) accept that innovations may relocate the limits of growth, making it possible to maintain the living standard by continuously reducing the consumption of crude materials and energy. However, one of the energy system's prevailing deficits is that depleted or not yet tapped resources are being (re-)obtained based on non-regenerative energy (Schwartzman, 2008), causing capitalistic production to be increasingly energetically inefficient (Murphy and Hall, 2011). Overcoming the energy crisis hence calls for the consideration of thermodynamic principles (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, Georgescu-Roegen, 1986; Martinez-Alier, 1987). Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) see the deployment of renewable energies as a possibility of limiting the creation of entropy. Kaberger and Mansson (2001) have shown that innovative resources-saving material cycles may be possible and economical if they are based on the usage of the inexhaustible energy of irradiance. What is promising about this approach is that, due to research and development, the utilisation of solar energy becomes more and more efficient and lucrative (Schmid, 2016). Moreover, its inexhaustible potential allows for the exploitation of material resources even from deposits with extremely low crude material density. On a local level, the utilisation of solar energy may actually lead to a reduction of entropy (Ebeling et al., 1998; Kranert and Cord-Landwehr, 2010), as it is the case with the usage of waste heat of solar thermal power plants for the desalination of sea water (DLR, 2007). The integration of these capacities into smart grids and the associated remodeling of every production process to purely regenerative sources have been detailed in Section 3. We further argue that innovation surpasses conceivability. Even Harris (2010) sees a particularly high potential in unpredictable technological innovations to break through economic routine, thus encouraging further entrepreneurs in issuing their own innovations. Capitalism might thereby be provided with the chance to reduce its ecological exploitation. But innovation exceeds strictly technological aspects and may as well comprise social and institutional aspects (Arentsen and Bellekom, 2014). E.g., in the mobility sector, whose pollutant emissions have significantly contributed to the environmental crisis, innovations have led to new features of cargo and passenger transportation. This is illustrated by the example of car sharing as an innovative life style (Prettenthaler and Steininger, 1999) or bicycle-sharing schemes in urban areas (Midgley, 2011). Another representative case is the history of the ozone hole, which Meadows et al. (2004) describe as a history of civil success regarding the correction of a severe overshoot. Quite in the sense of Schumpeter, Meadows et al. (2004) name the ‘industry's creative heads’ as the crucial problem-solving determinant. Through the three innovative boosts ‘better insulation’, ‘reduced toxic substitute materials’, and ‘emission-free alternative substances’, it will be possible to rebuild the original density of the ozone layer by the mid-21st century. Remarkably, this is realised without abandoning the existent economic system. Furthermore, we argue that it is realistic to assume growth-oriented, competitive markets in the future, rather than socio-material conditions beyond them, which, as stated by Van den Bergh (2011) are completely uncertain as of now (e.g. Harris, 2013: socialist markets). We therefore hold the view that it is more pragmatic to design future mass markets in an eco-friendly way. Kallis (2011) rejects the possibility that the wonder of a dematerialised economy might occur, as improvements of efficiency were overcompensated by growing consumption. While dematerialisation may be tantamount to a wonder, researchers still do put effort into adjusting the materialised economy to ecological compatibility. One aspect is the thorough redefinition of nature protection, because nowadays, nature protection is reduced to the attempt of limiting the harmfulness of processes and products (Mulhall and Braungart, 2010). However, due to the potential creation of new mass markets for more eco-friendly and efficient processes or products, this strategy holds the danger of actually augmenting unwanted effects through rebound effects. In this regard, Alcott (2005) points to the Jevon's Paradox which says it is a great error to think that technologic innovations were going to reduce the consumption of resources. Polimeni et al. (2015) name the example of the Green Revolution: the remarkable increase of food production's area efficiency was not at all able to abate the problems of hunger and area consumption, as consequently, the population greatly increased. Likewise, a mass market of efficient and eco-friendly products would again lead to a massive amount of poison and waste, with disposed crude materials hardly being recycled. The ecological costs then would have to be externalised, which Sturm and Vogt (2011) regard as strong evidence of the failure of the market. The core problem hence lies in the fact that products are being produced exclusively for the technosphere (McDonough and Braungart, 2013). E.g., copper is almost universally applicable to and beneficial for technological systems, while in biological systems, this material is extremely poisonous. Thus, the aim must be to design products in a way that makes them equally usable in biosphere, i.e. subsequent to their technical usage. This calls for the development of a combined management of nutrients for techno- and biosphere. Human ways of living, the processes and products they are based on, may thereby be employed for the benefit of nature. The focus must therefore be put on those innovations that break up the present paradigm of environmental protection by realising products that create a useful material connection between techno- and biosphere. An example of this kind of creative destruction is the Austrian company Gugler, the first print shop worldwide that produces printing products free from harmful ingredients and exclusively with substances that can be biologically recycled (Gugler GmbH, 2018). E.g., the accruing sludge is returned to biosphere and the ash of burned printing products can be reused as a fertilizer. These conditions provide the possibility of designing economic activities to be ecologically compatible despite a high resource throughput.

### 1NC

#### Speed hasn’t collapsed politics. Moments of decision are preceded by innumerable opportunities for intervention

Grove 8 – Jairus Victor Grove, Ph.D. Candidate at Johns Hopkins University in International Relations and Political Theory, “Chapter 1: A Schmittian Century?: From Nuclear Leviathan to Nuclear-Sovereign-Assemblage”, 3-17, http://becomingwar.blogspot.com/2008/03/chapter-1-schmittian-century-from.html

Initially nuclear weapons seemed to solidify even complete the decisionistic model of sovereignty once and for all. In Virilio’s reading of Schmitt’s the state of emergency became permanent and democracy ended once it became possible for a single individual to decide to got to war and to finish that war in 30 minutes. At first glance Virilio’s apocalyptic diagnosis seems accurate. Nuclear weapons at their current numbers could destroy the entire planet and given the structure of the United States nuclear command any Congressional or popular attempt to stop the war would be in vain. This is the backbone of Virilio’s argument. Politics and a democratic balance of power require time. Time to react, time to respond, time to debate, time to strategize, time to implement and ICBMS nullify time.

But Virilio is wrong. The threat of the extreme case has obscured the actual or present case that presents new opportunities for intervention. Politics, whether micro or macro, does not begin and end with the sovereign decision; the sovereign decision (both expressively and in its enactment) emerges from a relay of forces, connections, and other previous decisions, resonances, forces, and actants that are presupposed in each subsequent iteration of the sovereign decision, and layered in multiple streams of time. Even an increasingly automated nuclear arsenal requires the participation of literally millions of people and countless networks, objects, tectonic stability, stable solar flare activity and on and on. The decision only appears singular when Virilio truncates time to the moment the president ‘pushes the button.’ We are not as of yet in that moment so other temporal rhythms abound and each part of the nuclear assemblage follows a different temporal course.

The physical infrastructure of the nuclear arsenal for instance decays at every level. Even steel and concrete are not permanent and must be repaired and replaced. However the Department of Defense does not in fact have an industrial capacity of its own nor has it successfully deployed robots to run the nuclear silos or mined enough uranium or manufactured enough tritium to maintain the weapons we currently have. The liability of a neo-liberal system of procurement and production (including its all volunteer army) is that seemingly top secret and sequestered sites of nuclear stewardship bleed into the everyday economy of Americans citizen and the broader ecology of the planet.

Certainly the sovereign decision is a powerful, expressive, performative act of individuation for the sovereign and highly affective in mobilizing populations, but it is not self-constituted or self-causal. The process of individuation and mobilization necessitates a field of relations and resonances from which the sovereign decision emerges. The decision is also not decisive. Instead it territorializes the relations from which it emerges through its resonant modulation. The enunciation of a sovereign decision (a distinct inquiry from the ‘making of a decision. Certainly no less emeshed but nonetheless ought to remain analytically different) is something like a refrain, the sovereign—in so far as it is constituted by the enunciation of decisions—is a condensation point for national ethos, affect, and institutional identity making. Each decision is constitutive not of the ‘sovereign’ as is the case in Schmitt’s analysis but of a sovereign point of identification or reified, dogmatic consistency which can be recognized but need not remain static or immobile.

Again however such a node is only possible because of its attachments whether physical or resonant (both material) to the complex system of tradition, culture, wires, telephones, satellites, nuclear silos, television cameras, previous sovereign decisions, personal affective characteristics, character, etc. This list is not exhaustive by any measure however it gestures in the direction of what I am trying to get at. The sovereign is not an individual, at best it is an iterative series of moments of performative or expressive individuation resulting from a complex interface with machines, networks, affective fields. The assemblage has a life of its own that cannot and should not be reduced to a single point simply because that is most consistent with our common sensibilities.

In some sense the sovereign is a prosthesis or interface to be worn by whoever is elected to office. (President as first-person-shooter?) This does in part explain why there is so little transition time between each sovereign and so little variation in war powers. It is reference point or index for a history of actions and events made more complex by the function it is meant or believed to serve. It is the titular focal point of an assemblage that if recognized as such would undermine its own function. An assemblage that function because it can inspire belief in it is unity not its dispersed and multivalent organization.

The irony is that the development of miles of fiberoptic networks, new technological interfaces and mobility was supposed to save the centralized and hierarchical sovereign form from its obvious strategic liability—that of being an easy target. However in increasing its ‘survivability’ it has also opened innumerable points of access to the supposed center. Each access point whether it be technological, affective, or economic that can recenter, or reterritorialize the sovereign assemblage. I do not want to make this sound ‘easy’ or ‘painless’ however as this ‘dispersed’ or redundant network system has become ‘everyday’ increasingly the President has been unaware of exactly who is in control or even at how many levels the Nuclear-sovereign-assemblage can be engaged or reterritorialized.

The former Soviet Union has faced the dark side of this arrangement in the phenomena of ‘loose nukes’. In general the loss of sovereign control is seen as a ‘tragedy’, a prelude to destruction. As a result, the positive sites of intervention are less frequently recognized. However even the ‘dark side’ of losing control has a silver lining. North Korea has not been invaded and is now receiving significant food aid to relieve an ongoing famine in part because of it furtive nuclear development no doubt aided by the ‘loose nuke’ phenomena even if only the phenomena of ‘loose lips’ in the transfer of information.

It is also the case that the nuclear-sovereign-assemblage requires a massive industrial capacity to continue its day-to-day operations not to mention the difficulty of disposing of the waste made in its production. At both ends of the nuclear fuel cycle—mining and disposal—the Department of Defense lacks the industrial and waste management capacity to sustain either effort. Once private businesses, public and private land, and public finance become involved so to new population gain access to the assemblage and indeed become part of the assemblage. Effective divestment of South Africa and blood diamond producing countries demonstrate that the neo-liberal state apparatus cannot survive in isolation. The protest of many Indian nations from the Western Shashone in Nevada, the Navajo in New Mexico, to the Lakota Sioux, to allow new uranium mining and waste disposal on their land has politicized what was thought to be unpoliticizable. In each protest or hearing before the court the nuclear fuel cycle and its connection to a history of genocide and subsequent irradiation of the Indian survivors must be confronted. The Lakota Sioux—who have fought the expansion of Uranium mining and milling in the Dakotas—have as of December 20th, 2008 successfully succeeded from the United States and declared themselves a newly independent nation.

I will refer to this phenomenon as the neo-liberal liability a liability that is created from the economic and material assemblage required to support the nuclear arsenal. It is difficult to oppose capitalism because of its dispersed and differentiated machinic capabilities however the logic of capitalism—flow—is at odds with the necessities of the Nuclear-Sovereign-Assemblage—secrecy and carceral terroritoriality, the restriction or repression of flow. New lines of flight are created by the attempt to enhance the survivability of the sovereign. As the assemblage becomes more distributed and more complex a new fragility emerges. The assemblage is not fragile, the redundant network system enhances its ability to ‘survive’. However it undermines its ability to remain aborescent to sustain the identity necessary for centrality and hierarchy.

#### There is no singular prevailing social condition and it’s not ‘caused’ by acceleration or technology---dystopian speed determinism is completely misguided

Germain 9 – Dr. Gilbert G. Germain, Assistant Professor of Political Studies at the University of Prince Edward Island, PhD in Political Science from Notre Dame, MA and BA in Political Science from Carleton University, Spirits in the Material World: The Challenge of Technology, p. 158-162 [language modified]

THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY

To this point I have presented a largely sympathetic reading of the main players reviewed in these pages, focusing on their respective contributions to a self-defined problem. The time now has come to ask ourselves whether the problem they address exists at all. Although I have stressed that several of the readings of the reality problematic must be read ironically, I nonetheless have presented reasons why we ought not dismiss their admittedly dire assessments of our technological society and its future. Is this defense well taken? Are their more convincing arguments suggesting their pessimism is misguided and that modern technoscience is not as problematic as they claim it to be? A brief survey of the main counterarguments to technological pessimism will set the stage for further analysis.

The charge of technological determinism is often raised in connection with the dystopianism of thinkers like Virilio and Lyotard, not to mention Heidegger, Ellul, and others who share their intellectual sympathies. The criticism is that those who demonize technology often wrongly attribute to it, as one commentator notes, “a specific, coherent, and all-determining significance.” 7 They are thought guilty of reifying technology, which explains in part their penchant for referring to technology in the singular. Conflating the idea of technology with technology proper, the argument continues, these dystopians are able to impute to technological development an exclusive goal, such as the enslavement or dehumanization of humankind. Along with this error, critics assert that technological determinists fall prey to reductionist thinking. Reductionism is said to err on two fronts. One, it assumes the relative autonomy of various aspects of a social order, and for this reason assumes as well that they can be excised neatly from the whole and examined in isolation. Two, reductionist thinking errs in singling out a particular aspect of the social order, such as technology or the economy, and claiming it to be the efficient cause of the whole of that order. In response to the reductionist’s presuppositions and assertions, the critics argue that because no aspect of the whole stands in isolation from other aspects, technology, like every other component of society, functions as both cause and effect.

As stated, dystopians maintain that technology is the efficient cause of societal development. There is no countervailing force in their view to the technological imperative of efficiency. All aspects of the social order are informed and reordered in accordance with the dictates of technology, which themselves are immune to overriding influences by any kind of extraneous input, be it political, economic, or cultural. Although not a dystopian himself, the contemporary critical theorist Jürgen Habermas takes seriously the determinists’ concerns in his analysis of “the mediatization of the lifeworld.”8 His critique of technology asserts that the rationality associated with technology has overpowered the domain of communicative action, the “lifeworld.” This latter realm, the realm of politics, broadly defined, is being corrupted and distorted by the “system,” which has as its goal not mutual understanding but control in accordance with rational rules and procedures. Habermas shares with the dystopians a concern that, if not technology per se, then at least the spirit of technology, has colonized the social order as a whole to its detriment. But what he and most critics of the determinist position cannot countenance is the assumption that no force exists within society capable of altering the course of what is purported to be “autonomous” technological development. Habermas sees the lifeworld, and the rationality which informs it, as a distinct mechanism of coordinating societal action: It therefore stands against the system and its rationality. Both mechanisms serve as means to satisfy different sets of societal interests, and so both for him have their place within a well-functioning social order. For Habermas, the problem with technology has nothing to do with technology itself, with either its purposiveness or its focus on efficiency, but with its domination as a mechanism of societal coordination. Accordingly, the solution to the problem of technology for him lies in reinvigorating the lifeworld and the integrity of communicative action.

All critics of the dystopian philosophy of technology share with Habermas the view that there are competing logics at play within the social order which see to it that the domination of technology is less than total. Technology, they say, is not sufficiently monolithic to warrant either deification or demonization, but instead has the power both to restrict and extend human freedom. In monumentalizing technology and seeing it primarily as a negative force, the critics charge the dystopians with falling prey to one or more common fallacies. The first of these may be called the “design fallacy,” or the view that a technology invariably functions in the manner it was originally intended to function. Those who succumb to this fallacy see technology as an instrument that advances the power of those who own and implement it. Since technologies are regarded primarily as tools designed to extend control over the domain to which they are applied, their imposition necessarily leads to a loss of freedom on behalf of those at the receiving end of these instrumental forces. Dystopians, for instance, would regard technologies such as communications networks or the Internet as classic illustrations of “system” forces in that they are rationally structured and managed, and are distributed on a market that rewards efficiency. The freedoms and powers these technologies confer upon their users are more apparent than real, they assert, since their realization is framed by the rational demands of these specific technologies, as well of those of the larger technological system within which they are embedded. The critics, on the other hand, counter it is misleading to assume that just because these technologies are designed to maximize efficiency and extend the power of their managers, they must remain mere instruments of the system. They argue that the communicative practices facilitated by these technologies need not produce outcomes which reinforce system needs. Some observers cite the Minitel incident of the 1980s, where the French government’s introduction of an information distribution system was effectively sabotaged by the public to serve its own ends, as proving a more general claim that all technologies have the potential to be implemented in ways that can subvert the interests of the system.9

Critics also allege dystopians as falling victim to the “appeal-to-tradition fallacy.” The guiding assumption of this fallacy is that older technologies, by virtue of their relative primitiveness, function more directly as extensions of the human body and therefore are more attuned to the essence of our humanity. This nostalgic embrace of primitiveness leads dystopians to interpret every technological advance as another step toward an increasingly mediated and ultimately dehumanized existence. Looking, for instance, at the evolution of inscription technologies—extending from the first etching tools to word processing systems—dystopians see only a progression from more to less embodied forms of writing. Where words and symbols once were committed to a surface with the aid of a steady hand and a focused mind, they are now abstract “objects” of manipulation to be arranged and rearranged in accordance with the whims of the moment.

Heidegger perfectly captures this sentiment in his analysis of the typewriter, the word processing system of his era: “Mechanized writing,” he tells us, “deprives the hand of dignity in the realm of the written word and degrades the word to a mere means for the traffic of communication.”10 Heidegger’s fear, and the fear of dystopians in general, is that a change in the medium of linguistic expression affects not only the form of language, but more importantly the content of what is expressed. Hardly neutral, they see technology as actively transforming what it acts upon, conforming it to the technological demands of efficiency and standardization. While many critics of dystopianism concede that technology is not neutral, they take issue with the view that technological progress is necessarily dehumanizing. Admitting different technologies impose different forms on the material they act upon, and that some these forms indeed may be more mediated or mechanical than others, they conclude that never is the form so alien to human purposes that it precludes being used as a means of true intellectual or creative expression. To argue otherwise would be to claim, for example, that because a keyboard is a mechanized hand, those who use it are capable only of expressing mechanized thoughts. This absurd conclusion, the critics argue, underscores the fact that while technology imposes a form on what is expressed, this imposition does not necessarily extend to its content.

Finally, dystopians are accused of exaggerating the uniformity with which technology advances. In part as a consequence of their reifying technology, dystopians see the evolution of technology as a lock-step process composed of successive phases of instrumental sophistication. So it is, for instance, that we see ourselves living today in the Computer or Digital Age, as distinct from the Mechanical Age which preceded it. Critics dispel what may be called the “coherency fallacy” by pointing out that in any given period there is considerable diversity in types of technology. Hi-tech never displaces lo-tech entirely. Antiquaries such as bicycles, typewriters, vinyl LPs, pencils, and handpowered reel lawnmowers, still have a place in a world otherwise given over to the latest technological innovations. While dystopians tend to dismiss the persistence of antiquarian technologies as unimportant in relation to the overarching pattern of development, the critics see it as providing more evidence that technology is hardly the hegemon some claim it is. If, they say, we reflect on the manner we actually live our lives and the tools we rely on to facilitate our actions, we will see that our technological milieu is multilayered. That we lead technologically disjointed lives proves that technology does not hold sway over the human, at least not in the totalistic sense the dystopians would have us believe. We use technologies to satisfy our needs and desires, the nature of which (while conditioned by the technologies at our disposal) is not wholly determined by the technological milieu. If it were otherwise, they ask, how could one explain the enduring appeal of the lowly pencil in a virtual world, or the persistence of analog technologies in a digital age?

If the arguments against technological pessimism mentioned above hold any merit, then the problem with technology stems more from a misreading of technology than from technology itself. The critics of the dystopian vision, while cognizant of technology’s dark side, refuse to see its powers of coercion and self-perpetuation as anything more than propensities. Technology for them remains subvertible because it does not constitute a closed system. It follows that we do not, strictly speaking, live in a technological society because technology’s final end (i.e., efficiency) is not the only determinant of societal evolution. As powerful a force as technology may be, they assert, it remains one force among others and therefore subject to challenge. If there is a problem with technology, the critics of determinism say, it is a consequence of the failure of politics. Following Habermas, they assume that the excesses of technology result from underdeveloped communicative capacities and a corresponding weakened capacity for communities to dictate the ends to which technologies ought to be employed.

Much of what has been said in the preceding pages about the fate of reality is predicated on the determinist assumption that humanity is being ineluctably driven by technological development from the real world of space and time. The expressed concerns about reality’s demise and its dehumanizing consequences would lose their force if it could be shown that nothing in the logic of technology dictates such an end and that our technological “fate” remains, as always, squarely in our hands. Before we can decide which of the two sides of the debate presents the stronger argument, we must review the dystopian position’s likely response to the charge that it seriously misreads the essence of technology.

As noted, the critics of dystopianism argue that technological pessimists wrongly attribute to technology a single and all-determining purpose. They do so because they conflate the idea of technology with its exercise, thereby granting the essence of technology (i.e., efficiency) an inflated significance in the workings of society. By adopting this high-altitude intellectual posture, they invariably neglect the real world of technology, with its inconsistencies, paradoxes, and cleavages. This oversight accounts for the dramatic flair of much contemporary theorizing about technology, especially continental philosophizing, with its sweeping generalizations and dire pronouncements on the end of [hu]man[s], nature, or reality. Unfortunately, these critics charge, the grandiosity of their claims is matched by an equally formidable misreading of the nature of technology.

# 2NC

## T

### T – Games

#### Refusal of productivity is precisely the reason T is a voting issue. Debate is a game that requires rules. The aff tries to give a transcendent meaning to the ballot, but full immersion in switch side debate is the true subversion of neoliberal control. Only T solves the Aff.

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Some detractors treat electronic games as if they were a hard drug, but for Baudrillard (1979),1 the games are merely the equivalent of soft drugs. Like drugs, games fascinate us as much as they repel, and from the standpoint of Western reason, they arouse intellectual ambivalence (Baudrillard, 2002b). The game does this by leading us into an environment dominated by a mental surgery of performance -- a kind of "plastic surgery of perception" (Baudrillard, 1993c, p. 49). Yet when we are in the game, we are also protected from "the brutalizing effects of rationality, normative socialization, and universal conditioning" taking place in the social (Baudrillard, 1993c, p. 67). This is a very important aspect of the ambivalence of digital games for Baudrillard -- they originate in a society that is increasingly ambivalent about its future. The pleasure of the game is at best an uncertain and cool pleasure (Baudrillard, 1988). Baudrillard (1979) pointed to the artificial intensity surrounding the playing of digital games, but he found this to be not unlike that surrounding a person watching sports on television -- and every bit as unhealthy. But we are too concerned with health; the gamer worries about boredom far more than obesity and death. It is better to be a gamer than a jogger in Baudrillard's world! The jogger -- contrary to the delusional state he or she may be in -- struggles only to exhaust and destroy the body (Baudrillard, 1993c). Joggers disappear in Baudrillard's world. The gamer, too, longs to disappear, but in an ecstatic disappearance from which he or she is eternally reborn in the next game (Baudrillard, 1990). The gamer fears only the dizziness induced by the connections -- the lassitude of network man (Baudrillard, 1987). Gamers are viewed as immoral in the eyes of those who work to engage all of society in the production game. But the gamer is seduced by other possibilities and attempts to turn away from the order of production to an order of reversibility (Baudrillard, 1979). Reversibility for Baudrillard is the opposite of production, and gamers may be understood as an exemplary form of it. Ambivalence, however, is a two-way street: Ironically, the gamer is worked very hard by the game into a frenzied state of a will to mastery -- mastery of what amounts to nothing as the game he or she masters becomes instantly obsolete (and soon "upgraded" or replaced by another new game). Games, too, are victims of fashion, and there is no greater game than fashion (Baudrillard, 1993a). The gamer exists on the margins of political economy and is understood by some to be an example of the élan of the system in capturing everyone. The gamer, however, attempts to gain an escape velocity from the system of political economy. Some gamers feel their virtual worlds are the opposite of political economy and its hard currencies on which they frown. The currency of the gamer is simulacra, and simulacra now exist in abundance (Baudrillard, 1990). So with a nod to the political economist, we must recognize that the game should not take so long to master that it would interfere with the next round of the production of games. Like a drug that kills too many users, such a game would be against the interest of the system. The flow of games, like the flow of drugs, must not stop; the effects may be profitable and brutal but not fatal. Baudrillard forces us to wonder, though, are gamers actually onto something critics from outside of their realm miss? It seems a little too easy now for the political economist -- and some players of that productivist game have survived into the 21st century -- to see the social relations of the world outside of the game encompassing the world of the gamer. But as much as society reaches inside the game (attempting to capture the gamer), the world of the game infects society outside the game. Two Harvard researchers have recently released a study on how the "gaming generation" is changing the workplace as much as the places of play (Beck & Wade, 2006). Games infect all forms of entertainment today. The latest James Bond film (Casino Royale, a film stuffed with special effects; Campbell, 2006) contains a chase scene of several minutes' duration. It takes place high above the ground, between boom cranes, in a fantastic realm where the actors are placed in a field not unlike a Super Mario Brothers game. Only an audience that grew up in the realm of games could truly appreciate such a scene. Here the game seeps out into other areas of life. Perhaps it is by incorporating game logic that the system now attempts to pull some people out of the game and into the movie theatre. Attendance at films is in decline whereas game sales soar. At Casino Royale, the young people in the audience appeared to take great perverse delight in seeing the world of the game infuse the cinematic screen. Our tenuous grasp on the real (or in this case, what we will accept as "realistic" in a film) is challenged to the core by gamers. With so many people today gripped by the virtual, it is not surprising to see so much cinema devoted to the idea. Baudrillard (2000) has written about several films that fall into this obsession: The Truman Show, Total Recall, Existenz, and The Matrix. Baudrillard, who did not like The Matrix (he said it was "the kind of film about the matrix that the matrix would have been able to produce"; Baudrillard, 2004, p. 1), must have smiled wryly at the release of The Matrix Online (a role-playing game where players are required to protect "the matrix"). We may wonder if this is some sort of cinematic revenge on gamers or even an attempt by cinema to regain some of its lost confidence (Baudrillard, 1998). Gaming may also be, Baudrillard (1996) tells us, the only democracy we still know. Those who might have become political players in earlier times may well be the gamers of today -- virtual exiles of politics circulating the networks of a muted world. Gamers are among the contemporary inhabitants of the transpolitical -- "politically indifferent and undifferentiated beings" (Baudrillard, 1993c, pp. 24-25). Unlike reality, which incessantly demands we believe in it, the illusion of the game (which the gamer never really believes in) does not hold such a requirement. For Baudrillard, it is precisely because the gamer does not believe in the game that (they) ~~he or she~~ enters into a more necessary relationship with the rules of the game. Here society and the law are replaced by a symbolic pact with the rules -- a series of ritual obligations (Baudrillard, 1979) -- that are, for Baudrillard, an order of fate. All are equal before the arbitrary rules of the game in a way we are not equal before the law in society (Baudrillard, 1996). The game is a very severe place of rules where wealth and social standing have no purchase. If games attract us, for Baudrillard (1979), the reason is clear: "Games are serious, more serious than life" (p. 133). The game is a challenge and the dark sphere inhabited by its players involves a strong passion for rules (Baudrillard, 1979). Baudrillard (1979) understands the gamer to exist in a kind of hyperfreedom where the arbitrariness of the program is exchanged for society and the law. The game is perhaps the most poetic way we have yet discovered to "rid ourselves," he says, "of social conceptions of freedom" (Baudrillard, 2005b, p. 55). The spirit of gaming extends, for Baudrillard, back to well before the arrival of the virtual and technological gamer of today. We have long been avid devotees of games -- of a kind of rules-bound uncertainty and unpredictability we enjoy in our simulated absence from society while engaged in any game (Baudrillard, 1990). For Baudrillard (2001), the rules of the game "seem to come from some other sphere, with nothing to justify them -- just like chance, that eternal unjustified principle" (p. 90). Ambivalence reappears here as he considers that our submission to chance in the game is, at the same time, a way of parodying the ethics of work, value and economy (Baudrillard, 1979). The game contains the passion of illusion and appearances, and who is more passionate today than the gamer? (Baudrillard, 1990) For Baudrillard (2005a), "the fundamental passion is that of the game" (p. 149). This passion, in our transpolitical era, is replacing political passions from earlier times. Today, Baudrillard (1993a) says, even "hope bringing movements" (green or feminist) become part of the promotional machine of American and Western culture (p. 152). The cool passion of the game, an important aspect of its cool ambivalence, works to replace the former hot passions of politics or the body. When we play a game, we are impassioned, says Baudrillard, by the stakes -- not necessarily a positive or negative passion but a passion just the same -- the "passion of battle," he calls it (Baudrillard, 2005a, p. 149). We play the game, we make progress through its network, we lose, and we lose again; eventually we may even win -- it is the passion of this experience. In the place of liberty in today's society, Baudrillard (1979) finds instead the game and reminds us that our very passion for games and rules parodies all ideologies of liberty. The gamer thus plays for the charm of the game, its seductiveness, and as such embraces repeatedly the catastrophe of losing the game. The gamer accepts the arbitrary rules of the game for what Baudrillard (1990) calls "ceremonial purposes" -- for the ambivalent pleasure of play and of playing in a realm away from the contractual and regulated legal exchanges of society (p. 153). For Baudrillard, what we desire most in the game is that the "inexorable procession of rational connections" of the social cease for a while (p. 153). The purpose of playing the game, or of gambling for Baudrillard, is not in believing one can win but in escaping the system of rationality outside of the game. The old sites of gaming, such as the casino, are now contaminated with leverless push-button electronic games. In the loud and monotonous corners of casino machine gaming today, the almost lifeless human prosthetic of the game plays for money, whereas the virtual gamer at his or her computer plays for passion. Gamers seek passion in one of its last discernable places -- even the passion of the virtual sex gamer is poured into the networks in a world where sex, like politics, has been divested of passion. "From the virtual perspective the real is only a vestige, so too are sex, work, and the body" (Baudrillard, 2001, p. 42). And it is from the vantage points of the virtual that the gamer plays himself or herself into Baudrillard's lens. Our passion for games arises, to a good extent, from our lack of passion for anything else. Politics itself has always been a game, but now it is one that "continues in secret indifference to its own stakes**"** (Baudrillard, 1993c, p. 6). Is the gamer the true citizen of the postmodern? For Baudrillard (1993a), the postmodern is itself a kind of game -- a game with the vestiges of what has been destroyed. 2. The Gamer and the Obsession of Our Age The master gamer is a wizard in virtuality; Baudrillard was a wizard of virtuality. Some of his ambivalence about games and gamers no doubt has much to do with the role of the gamer as one vital part of a system that he felt is seeking to become increasingly virtualized. As astronauts (the explorers of a previous age) were the white mice of a world learning to live with less gravity, the gamer is the experimental creature who teaches us about life in the virtual. The gamer, for Baudrillard, is an experimental explorer in virtuality who participates in a kind of test humanity is putting itself through in the contemporary. Baudrillard (1997) says that when he or she is playing the game, the gamer ceases to be an agent of the real and becomes a double agent of the virtual. Today, the limits of virtual reality are pushed greatly by the demands of gamers. In the game, we pass over into the extreme of technology and become extreme phenomena (Baudrillard, 1996). Baudrillard has long understood that we learn a great deal from the study of extreme phenomena. Among the lessons of thinking about gamers is that any power we possess in the virtual is merely a virtual power (Baudrillard,1998). In a most ambivalent way, this virtual power mirrors the world outside of the game, where genuine power no longer exists (Baudrillard,1994). There are no masters of a virtual universe where power is fragile (Baudrillard, 2002b). We can certainly understand what Baudrillard means by the fragility of power, even global power in our so-called real world, following September 11, 2001. For Baudrillard (2002a), the gamer is a traveler into our future of total immersion in virtuality -- as yet a kind of techno-tourist basking in the sickly artificial light of the virtual. Here, as a visitor to what may come after the end, the gamer enters the "horizon of programmed reality" in which, for Baudrillard (2000), our human functions -- emotions or sexuality -- become progressively useless (p. 37). The world of the gamer is both an escape from the social and a passage into a clone of the so-called real world (Baudrillard, 2002b). In the game, we adhere to our sticky monitors (a good game "glues" us to the screen). With or without our condom-like data suits (Baudrillard, 2005b), we enter the world of the digitized and operationalized (Baudrillard, 2003), the highest stage of simulation (Baudrillard, 2005b). But with Baudrillard, it is never long before the ambivalence returns and he encourages us to wonder why, if our "real world" is so magnificent, we would seek to build its virtual double, including our own doubles to inhabit it? Baudrillard (1995) forces us to wonder if we prefer the "exile of the virtual" to the "catastrophe of the real" (p. 28). It is one of the sublime qualities of Baudrillard's writing that he forces us to see ourselves as occupants of an uncertain world where the real hides behind appearances (Baudrillard, 1998). Ours is an existence of unceasing illusion. Against notions of an artificial paradise of "technicity and virtuality," Baudrillard (2000) also urges us to preserve traces of our illusory world's definitive opacity and mystery (p. 74). Before the digital and virtual, we were full-fledged citizens of a world not of the real but of appearances, behind which the real hides (Baudrillard, 2006). Our passage into the screens of virtuality is merely one step farther away from our world of appearances -- already one step farther away from a world we never "really" know. So Baudrillard understands the efforts of the gamer to be a kind of experimental existence in a world that we can never actually inhabit. At some future point, our "immersion in the machinery of the virtual, the man/machine distinction may no longer exist," but at present, the failures of the gamer to remain in the game are a hopeful sign for Baudrillard (2005b) of the insuperability of the barriers to a virtual existence (pp. 80, 192). As he wrote near the end, "It is one thing to note the vanishing of the real into the virtual; another to deny it so as to pass beyond the real and the virtual as Nietzsche passed beyond good and evil" (p. 162). To the question, "What if Baudrillard were a gamer?" the answer is Baudrillard was not a gamer and he could never be a digital gamer -- they held no personal fascination for him. The only interest the cool universe of digitality held for him was as a writer (Baudrillard, 1993b). Like television, once he had broken its code, so too for games, the interest was lost (Lotringer, 2007). Baudrillard, it seems, wished to pass beyond both the real and the virtual, and his ambivalence rests on the fact that he had little interest in participating in either. Writing, of course, was another matter. The world of gaming and all forms of virtuality were, by the end, merely things he wished to pass beyond, and writing is how we get to the next horizon. Games enter Baudrillard's writing so often because of their important role in writing about our contemporary -- a period during which, Baudrillard felt, we are undertaking a grand experiment (perhaps the greatest game of all) to see if anything human can truly survive. The realm of the game is a highly artificial realm, but it is merely one such realm in our contemporary that is a time of cloning, simulation, modeling and programming, and genetic ordeals: Perhaps we may see this as a kind of adventure, a heroic test: to take the artificialization of living beings as far as possible in order to see, finally, what part of human nature survives the greatest ordeal. If we discover that not everything can be cloned, simulated, programmed, genetically and neurologically managed, then whatever survives could be truly called 'human': some inalienable and indestructible human quality could finally be identified. Of course, there is always the risk, in this experimental adventure, that nothing will pass the test -- that the human will be permanently eradicated. (Baudrillard, 2000, pp. 15-16) Conclusion And so for Baudrillard, the time of this experiment is an uncertain one. The other side of our possible eradication is that the virtual -- the game -- may save us from the perfect crime, of what Baudrillard (2000) calls the "extermination by technology and virtuality of all reality" (p. 55). Here Baudrillard wonders if the digital game participates merely in the ironic game of technology, of what he calls "an ironic destiny of all science and all knowledge by which the world, and the illusion of the world, are saved and perpetuated" (p. 55). Here Baudrillard was decidedly undecided as gamers and games aroused in him a definitive ambivalence. Baudrillard matched the ambivalence of games with an equal or greater ambivalence of his own. Baudrillard was a writer and the game of the writer, from Baudrillard's (1993a) point of view, was the game of indifference and ambivalence. For Baudrillard, notions such as truth, meaning, or the real can be known only locally, as partial objects, along restricted horizons. The point of writing about a world that is enigmatic and unintelligible is not to add meaning to it but to make it even more enigmatic and more unintelligible. As he put it, Here... lies the task of philosophical thought: to go to the limit of hypotheses and processes, even if they are catastrophic. The only justification for thinking and writing is that it accelerates these terminal processes. Here, beyond the discourse of truth, resides the poetic and enigmatic value of thinking. For, facing a world that is unintelligible and enigmatic, our task is clear: we must make that world even more unintelligible, even more enigmatic. (Baudrillard, 2000, p. 83) The gamer is the ambivalent explorer of an age experiencing first-hand the immersion, immanence, and immediacy of the virtual. Baudrillard (2005b) wonders if the gamer may even be the cusp of a new evolutionary form: homo fractalis. If the gamer is not such a form in the long run, then he or she may be remembered simply as someone who became caught up in the obsession of our age, "the lack of distinction between the real and the virtual" (Baudrillard, 2006, p. 92). Today, few are more ambivalent about our contemporary than the gamer surrounded, as he or she is, by virtual technologies that propagate undecidability (Baudrillard, 1998). Given that none of us really knows the rules of the "game" today, indifference and ambivalence become very strategic terrains for a writer (Baudrillard, 1993a). Baudrillard was not a gamer but he shared with them a definitive ambivalence.

# 1NR

## K

### OV

#### Vote negative on timeframe and magnitude – can’t change systems of power within the limited time we have.

Aronoff & Denvir 21 [Kate, staff writer at the New Republic, writing fellow at In These Times, Daniel, visiting fellow in International and Public Affairs at Brown Univ, “Capitalism Can’t Fix the Climate Crisis,” *Jacobin*, 08/25/21, <https://jacobinmag.com/2021/08/capitalism-climate-crisis-global-green-new-deal-clean-energy-fossil-fuel-industry>, accessed 08/26/21, JCR]

DD: You write: “My argument in this book is not that capitalism has to end before the world can deal with the climate crisis. Dismantling a centuries-old system of production and distribution, and building a carbon-neutral and worker-owned alternative, is almost certainly not going to happen within the small window of time the world has to avert runaway disaster. The private sector will be a major part of the transition off of fossil fuels. Some people will get rich, and some unseemly actors will be involved. Capitalist production will build solar panels, wind turbines, and electric trains. But whether we deal with climate change or not can’t be held hostage to executives’ ability to turn a profit. To handle this crisis, capitalism will have to be replaced as society’s operating system, setting out goals other than the boundless accumulation of private wealth.” This argument provoked a bit of controversy in the audience a few years back in Chicago when we discussed it on a panel at the Socialism Conference. Both of us would love to live in a socialist world, and we’ve got to continue to fight for one. But why do you think that it’s important for people to understand that we need to deal with climate change before we win an entirely new mode of production? What’s entailed by the conclusion that we need to pursue radical social-democratic reforms on the road to socialism? Is this a theory of how radical social-democratic reforms can lead to socialism? Is it just a reality that the fast-ticking climate clock imposes on us? Or is it some of both? KA: It’s a reality. If the climate crisis were playing out over the course of two hundred, three hundred, or a thousand years, one could have an interesting theoretical debate about whether we should change the system we have and tweak it slightly in order to take on the crisis, or whether we should create an entirely new mode of production and build up a workaround alternative. Unfortunately, we just don’t have that time. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] outlined in its 2018 report on 1.5 degrees Celsius that we had roughly twelve years. That is now nine years in which to rapidly decarbonize the global economy, which is an enormous challenge. In order to meet that ever-shrinking twelve-year window, we have to use the productive system in which we live — which is not my ideal situation, but then again, neither is global warming.

### Link Debate

#### The pessimism of the Aff is a self-fulfilling prophecy – progressive idealism that uses liberal democratic institutions to win broad public support for transformative change is key

Karlsson 13 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “Ambivalence, irony, and democracy in the Anthropocene,” *Futures*, http://bit.ly/2lCoG1N]

When confronted by, one hand, the unsustainable nature of existing socioeconomic arrangements and, on the other, the radicalism of any meaningful alternative, one possible response is to retreat into post-modern irony (Behler, 1990; Szerszynski, 2007:343). As all irony, it is a stance which requires minimal personal engagement. Instead of taking active responsibility for the future and trying to articulate intelligent ways of moving society forward, such an ironic stance is often characterized by apathy and resignation about the prospects of liberal democracy. While this apathy may be the result of everything from Marxists beliefs about the impossibility of political comprise to neoliberal opposition towards democratic agency, the result is surprisingly similar. For one reason or the other, the idea of radical democratic change is rejected and replaced with irony and political procrastination. Instead of idealism we find a growing cynicism, a cynicism which in itself is then often used to prove the impossibility of idealism. While passivity towards the future is nothing new (prior to the Enlightenment, it was in many ways the default orientation), it is in a way a paradoxical stance given how profoundly humanity has proven capable of reshaping its own social conditions over the last couple of centuries. Much has been written about why we, despite all the evidence of the opposite, have come to in this manner lose faith in our ability to democratically shape the future (Johnson, 2004; Nassehi, 1994). Beyond all elaborate attempts to explain the exhaustion of our utopian energies, a very simple answer could be a genuine lack of political imagination. While there is definitely no shortage of radical ideas per se, what is missing is convincing socioeconomic theories and intelligent stories about how to make transformative change possible in a pluralist world. Instead of developing such new unifying theories capable of winning broad democratic support, many academics have been drawn into critical theory in a way that has undermined their own ability to draw qualitative political distinctions and left them simply convinced that “the whole is false” (Bronner, 1999:181). Outside academia, conspiracy theories and other alternative epistemologies have come to play a similar role in undermining political subjectivity and the sense of collective responsibility for the future. While it is true that the Enlightenment itself always advocated moderation and toleration with its sceptical attacks on all human presumptions (just think of Voltaire), it was still founded on an unfailing commitment to social progress and the advancement of human civilization. Lacking that progressive commitment, many contemporary social theorists seem to rather take pride in their own marginalization and the futility of their “resistance” against the neoliberal hegemony.

### 1NR – Recut

#### Last paragraph says the alt is the solution to monopoly capitalism – GU reads blue.

Pettifor ’21 (Ann, director of the Policy Research in Macroeconomics (PRIME) research network, fellow at the New Economics FoundationSept. 15, <https://bostonreview.net/forum/industrial-policy%e2%80%99s-comeback/ann-pettifor-state-emergency>)

In their well-executed argument for a new approach to economic policy, Mazzucato, Kattel, and Ryan-Collins spell out how governments could develop an industrial policy to shape and drive innovative opportunities for the future. They rightly demolish the folk tales of neoliberalism: the elevation of markets to mythical status, the reverence for allegedly “independent” central bankers, the skepticism of government action, and the deregulation of trade and foreign direct investment. While the authors offer both practical and effective strategies for tackling grand challenges, they offer only part of the solution. I deliberately use the word “could,” however, because a lot hangs on future conditions. While the authors offer both practical and effective strategies for tackling grand challenges, they offer only part of the solution. There are two major gaps in their account that suggest another approach may be needed. First, while the authors rightly recognize the major challenge posed by climate change, their argument does not convey the urgency of the sixth great extinction and climate breakdown. Human activities have so deeply impinged upon and destabilized the natural order that we have put both countless other species and our own at risk. A paper published last June in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences warned of civilizational collapse. Given the scale of global warming and biodiversity collapse—as well as the catastrophic consequences it is bringing and will continue to bring—this is no time to be writing about “growth” and an expansion of industrial activity. Indeed, the injunction to “build back better” mistakenly suggests that a global economy of 9 billion people can continue to invade the natural order, to extract and exploit even more of Earth’s finite resources. Even if governments ignore these constraints and go full steam ahead on ambitious industrial strategy, they may well be overwhelmed by another sudden, traumatic, and synchronized catastrophe. In 2014 Oxford development scholar Ian Goldin warned in The Butterfly Defect of pandemics in the pipeline. In his new book, Rescue, he now warns of the “growing inequality, extreme poverty, and ecological breakdown” in our future. These are not optimal conditions for an industrial strategy. The second gap is a kind of misdiagnosis. The authors follow Goldin in assuming that “neoliberalism” is the “dominant economic model” today. It is not. Instead, as Susan K. Sell has recently argued, “the term ‘neoliberalism’ . . . has become a very large conceptual tent that obscures some important differences between the sharp shift to markets in the 1970s and 1980s under Reagan and Thatcher and the global capitalism of the twenty-first century.” As Sell explains: Key features of the contemporary era include the outsized role of intangibles in the global economy (e.g., intellectual property, services, financial instruments such as derivatives and securities), the rise of financialization, the quest for profits over economic growth, and the pursuit of competitiveness—not competition—in global markets. These features are not always compatible with orthodox, hard-line neoliberalism. Under this new order, there is increased concentration of economic power, and the owners of intangibles face even less competition than they did before thanks to the state-financed protection of intellectual property (IP) law. Another distinctive feature of capitalism today is the way it has decimated labor rights and gutted unions—even more comprehensively than under Reagan and Thatcher. Work has become more precarious, even while societies have relied on “essential workers”—in many sectors mostly drawn from communities of color—for their survival throughout the pandemic. These labor market developments, coupled with systemic racism and ever-increasing digitalization, mean that a corporation like Apple—which calls itself a technology company, not an intangibles company—can bring in $1,500 per iPhone, whereas Foxconn and its workers—who manufacture the actual product—get pennies on the dollar. As Mazzucato and colleagues point out, governments have “accepted externally imposed rules-based frameworks limiting discretionary interventions.” They have done so because international trade agreements are not about trade at all—as even a classical neoliberal might point out—but about entrenching the oligopolies of home-grown IP corporations and billionaires, owners of intangibles, and controllers of global value chains. Governments have neglected antitrust enforcement at home, Sell argues, because they care less about concentration in domestic markets and more about their corporations being globally competitive. Ever since the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations that ended in 1993, the United States has worked tirelessly to increase property protection, whether through the Trans-Pacific Partnership or massive public investment in the military to ensure enforcement. Even in a global pandemic, “mission-oriented” governments could not ensure the global distribution of a vaccine. This protection explains why, even in a global pandemic, “mission-oriented” governments could not ensure the global distribution of a vaccine. Patents had been written to exclude others from using knowledge owned by the vaccine manufacturing corporations or Big Pharma. And it’s not just vaccines. A review of the range of masks used during the COVID-19 pandemic revealed that 309 had industry-backed patents behind them. As Sell argues, any government wishing to protect the health and thereby the domestic economy of its people—by compulsory licensing and parallel importation, say, to make essential medicines affordable and accessible—would find its pro-health initiatives blocked by Big Pharma, given the threat to profits and to shareholder capital gains. This state-backed enforcement of concentrated economic power, together with a state-subsidized financial system buoyed by central bankers, gives the lie to the suggestion that our dominant economic model is neoliberal. In other words, the problem is not that states are not action-oriented. Instead it is that taxpayer resources are deployed to sponsor an increasingly concentrated private sector that has intensified inequality. It is thanks to political decisions—such as the Nixon Shock to international financial architecture fifty years ago—that capital is mobile, that public assets are privatized, and that taxes are dodged. Meanwhile, taxpayers have repeatedly come to the rescue of the private, globalized, and deregulated financial system, bailing them out when they inevitably fall into crisis. In just the same way, the power of today’s Big Pharma oligopolies depends on capital mobility, tax evasion, and a private, deregulated shadow banking system, which in turn is backed and managed by public servants at central banks. Putting all this together, the lesson is clear: if governments are to use Earth’s finite resources to develop viable strategies for tackling the grand challenges that threaten the very existence of human civilization, the answer cannot lie in the sound creation of an “industrial policy,” however ambitious. The globalized, financialized, monopoly capitalism of our day instead requires wholesale structural reform. Recognition of the role played by taxpayers and states in upholding and extending the power of both Silicon Valley oligopolies and Wall Street investment banks should provide the rationale, the anger, the energy, and the momentum to bring today’s capitalism to heel in the interests of public institutions, public resources, and the public good. Only then will it be possible for governments to devise strategies that protect the security and interests of their people.